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ABSTRACT
A study of the technological requirements of a Planetary Return
Sample Mission was conducted. The state-of-the-art for problems unique
to this class of missions was assessed and technological gaps were
identified.
The problem areas where significant advancement of the state-of-
the-art is required are:
• Life support for the exobiota during the return trip and
within the Planetary Receiving Laboratory (PRL).
• Biohazard assessment and control technology.
• Quarantine qualified handling and experimentation methods and
equipment for studying the returned sample in the PRL.
Concepts for solving these problems are discussed.
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1.0 SUMMARY
We have reviewed the fragmentary literature on planetary return
sample technology and selected what we believe to be meaningful contri-
butions. To these we have added our own innovations to bridge some
of the important gaps and to extend this relatively sparse technology.
Our objective is to define an approach which meets the practicalities
of Planetary Return Sample Missions.
We have addressed the problem of acquiring and transferring a
sample to the returning spacecraft. A quarantine qualified concept
for accomplishing this objective without requiring in-flight steril-
ization is presented. The major steps in the technique, which is based
on maintaining physical biobarriers around the returning spacecraft
and sample, are:
• The sample is collected, sealed in a container and
placed in a sample collection capsule on the planet.
• A flexible bioshield is deployed around the second
stage of the return vehicle prior to docking with the
ascent vehicle.
• An electrostatic precipitator is used to minimize the
bioload transfer from the ascent vehicle to the bio-
shield at docking.
• The sample is transferred to the sample return container
•using flexible biobarrier and heat sealing techniques,
thus effecting aseptic transfer without in-flight
sterilization.
• The electrostatic precipitator is jettisoned with
the ascent vehicle at separation.
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• The biobarrier is jettisoned with the first stage
of the return vehicle during the initial phase of
the return orbit injection maneuver.
In addition to obviating the difficult sterilization procedures,
the described technique also provides for verification of the
integrity of the bioshield during the critical sample transfer
maneuver.
We have addressed the problem of sequestering and preserving a
planetary sample for the return voyage from Mars to Earth. A JPL study
(1) defining the contamination and preservation criteria for a Mars
Return Mission was used as the point of departure. The criteria were
analyzed for impact on the sample cannister design and sample life
support strategy.
A materials study was conducted to define acceptable construction
materials for use in the sample cannister.. Each of the elements and
representative glasses including fused silica were evaluated on the
basis of:
• gaseous permeation
• chemical reactivity including catalytic action
• biological reactivity and toxicity
• radioactivity
• naturally occurring isotopes
• other physical parameters
Gold was found to be the only material which satisfies all known require-
ments .
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A review of sealing technology was conducted to identify sealing
concepts capable of meeting the desired leak rate of 10~10 cc/sec STP of
He under a differential pressure of one bar. Ultra-high vacuum technology
has produced two seal types which have demonstrated performance at these
levels:
(1) Metallic knife-edge seals, in particular, a
concept described by Wishart and Bancroft
C2) which offers advantages for cylindrical
containers.
(.2) Liquid metal and low melting point eutectic
seals.
Design concepts for the sample container using these seals are described.
A generalized analysis of the life support problem during the
return voyage was conducted. We found that a basic disparity exists in
the risk/reward functions for a given life support strategy depending on
the intended end use of the sample. Specifically, a conflict arises
between the optimum strategy of life support for the biological component
and contamination risk which is of paramount importance to the physical
sciences. We conclude that separation of the sample into at least two,
and possibly more, smaller, separately sequestered and maintained portions,
is desirable.
Against this background a number of distinct life support strategies
was considered. Five of these, characterized as follows, are described:
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• simple containment
• containment plus hypothermia
• . containment with thermal control
and radiation simulation
.• hypothermia plus infinite reservoir
• simulated diurnal cycle plus
active gas exchange
We have attempted to define critical information requirements
necessary to make knowledgeable and prudent judgements relative to
the life support strategies to be adopted for the return voyage. The
information required generally involves understanding the transactions
occurring across the boundaries between the sample and the atmosphere,
the sample and the underlying soil, and interactions with incoming
radiation. For example, if the photolytic component of photosynthesis
occurs in the bulk of the atmosphere as suggested by Wolfgang (3) and
Horowitz et al. (4) as opposed to occurring in biota as is the case on
Earth, major adjustments in life support strategy may be necessary.
We have analyzed the sample headspace gas exchange problem and
examined the data to be obtained by Viking for use in defining a life
support strategy. We conclude that the Viking life detection and
atmospheric analysis experiments will provide useful but incomplete
information relative to the rates of gas exchange and atmospheric
constituents involved.
A post-Viking mission using the backup spacecraft with minor
modifications to the exobiology detection instruments could provide a
much more comprehensive data base for a Mars Return Sample Mission.
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Against the contingency that data from such a mission would not be
available, we have studied and defined a "brute force" technique for
improving the tolerance to disequilibra between the collected sample
and its headspace gas constituents.
The methodology for compensating for sample-atmosphere disequilibria
involves providing a scrubber for removing metabolic product gases and a
supply reservoir of the metabolite gases normally existing in low
concentrations in the planetary atmosphere. Both reservoirs are based
on adsorption-desorption action by a zeolite, operate at low internal
pressures, and, except for valving, are passive devices. A gas chro-
matograph based on Viking technology, but employing a new column and
recycled carrier gas, could provide head space composition monitoring
and act as the control sensor.
We have concluded that, unless post-Viking missions are undertaken
that provide substantially more information than will be available from
Viking on water, nutrient, and ion exchange across the sample boundaries,
it would be unwise to attempt to provide nutrients, water, or ion
compensation during the return trip.
In face of the uncertainty of adequate life support for the return
trip, a historical record of a number of physical parameters within the
sample could be an invaluable aid in reconstructing the original sample
state from measurements on a possibly altered sample upon return to
Earth. In many instances the act of obtaining this historical
record would result in increased risk of contaminating the
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sample and would also result in a significantly more complicated
instrument. We have ordered the priorities for recorded data as
follows:
1. Sample temperature
2. Headspace gas composition including water vapor,
CO, C02, CH4, H2S, 02, S0x/ N0x, NS/ NH3, form-
aldehyde, and ethylene
3. Visual image of sample surface interface with
headspace atmosphere
4. Response to selected nutrient additions
5. Other physical parameters
To a large extent, the decision as to how far down the priority
list one goes for a specific mission is coupled to the biohazard
assessment and control (BAG) stategy adopted for the mission. For
example, a reasonably comprehensive BAG package would provide a
surrogate record of many of the desired parameters. In this case,
the sample temperature would be measured to the exclusion of the
other parameters. Maximum emphasis would be placed on maintaining a
pristine sample.
A comprehensive biohazard assessment and control strategy should
be given high priority for planetary return missions and in particular
for a Mars Sample Return Mission. We have defined a BAG strategy
based on contingency sterilization of the sample, growth and
inhibition studies of the exobiota on the planetary surface under
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terrestrial environmental conditions, and monitoring of interaction
between a duplicate sample with selected terrestrial microecosystems
in planetary orbit and during the return trip. We believe that updated
Viking technology can be used to implement these critical experiments
and we have described a concept which we believe would result in a
prudent and practicable BAG plan. With the Viking biology package
development experience as background, we recognize the long lead
times and difficulty associated with this type of space experiment.
We have identified below what we believe to be the most critical
development problems and have recommended a plan for attacking these
problems:
1. Life support for the exobiota during the- return
trip and within the PRL.
2. BAG technology.
3. Quarantine qualified handling and experimentation
methods and equipment for studying the returned
sample in the PRL.
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2..0 INTRODUCTION
In the previous reporting period (5), critical questions
regarding the justification for, and potential risk involved in
returning a planetary sample were considered. Specifically,
the following topics were explored:
• Scientific justification for the return of a
planetary sample.
• Biohazard assessment criteria.
• Types of information necessary to control,
contain, or totally destroy extraterrestrial
life and means for acquiring this infor-
mation.
• Problems in educating the scientific and
lay communities regarding the benefits,
risks and associated safeguard measures
for the return of a planetary sample.
2.1 Objective for Current Investigations
During the course of these preliminary considerations,
it became clear that a number of critical technology gaps exist
which would require detailed study in order to evaluate the
feasibility of a mission to return a planetary sample. The
following objectives were set for continued study to more
clearly illuminate and fill in these technological gaps:
• Identify the critical technological problem
areas which must be solved with respect
to safety and quarantine considerations.
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9 Identify the specific key technology de-
ficiencies within each general area.
• Develop and test concepts for solving
the specific problems identified.
2.2 Background Summary for a Planetary Return Sample
Mission '• ~
In order to provide a clear and concise statement of the
underlying assumptions which form a basis for evaluating existing
technology against the probable requirements for a Planetary
Return Sample Mission, a typical generalized mission is described.
The presentation will first simply describe the mission. Then the
implications of the mission constraints, biological considerations,
and quarantine decisions will be more fully elaborated. It is
assumed that the mission is unmanned, at least for the inter-
planetary portion. A Mars return sample mission of the orbital
type (6) is assumed. Figure 1 illustrates the mission
profile.
The first phase of the mission is comprised of the launch,
cruise, and Mars orbit maneuvers of the spacecraft. This portion
of the mission will be similar to the Viking Mission . Depending
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on the relative positions of Mars and Earth and the particular
orbits chosen, the time span for this portion of the mission will
be 250 - 700 days (7).
After arriving in the selected Mars orbit, the descent
vehicle will separate from the main spacecraft and make a soft
landing on Mars. The descent vehicle will carry the Mars
sample collection capsule and perhaps a rover-type vehicle to
allow multiple samples to be acquired over a wider variety of
Martian terrain. The sampling system will obtain samples
from the surface to a depth of four to ten cm and load these
samples into the Mars sample collection capsule. The geo-
metrical integrity of the sample strata will be preserved if
feasible. The Viking collection system does not preserve the
sample strata integrity and a new collection system design
will be required for this feature.
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It is probable that some sort of "quick-look" life detection
system and/or physical assay system will be incorporated into
the sample collection system or collection capsule. The use of
this opportunity to select the most suitable samples for return
can probably be realized within likely weight restrictions for the
descent vehicle, particularly if the rover concept is not used.
The Viking or AMML technology can provide the basis for
this capability.
After collection of (a) suitable sample(s), the ascent vehicle
will separate from the lander and achieve Mars orbit. It will be
contaminated. One of the major areas for investigation is the
problem of getting the contaminated Mars sample collection
capsule into the Mars sample container without spreading this
contamination to the return container exterior or to other portions
of the return spacecraft. This problem is discussed in detail in
subsequent sections of this report.
Assuming that some "sanitary" method of docking the
sample capsule to the return container can be devised, the next
step in the mission will probably consist of a series of experiments
in Mars orbit. The return container will have much less stringent
weight constraints than those applied to the sample capsule and
the return container can be more highly instrumented. It is
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anticipated that at least the following types of tests will be con-
ducted before commiting to the return risk:
, • Life tests under Mars and Earth
environmental conditions.
e Interaction with typical Earth ecosystems '
e Inhibition reactions.
Depending upon the overall mission quarantine protocol
and the results of the Mars orbit tests, the sample will begin
the return cruise or the mission can be aborted. In addition
to this basic decision, a range of possibilities with respect to
sample sterilization treatment may be considered. If the sample
is returned, more tests will be performed during the return
cruise. In addition, depending upon the desired state of the
sample, some life support and/or environmental control for
the sample will be required. The definition of suitable life
support/environmental control concepts which are compatible
with the Planetary Return Sample Mission quarantine protocol
is regarded as another major area of technological deficiency.
Assuming the tests during the return cruise indicate
acceptable risk, the return spacecraft will achieve Earth orbit.
At this point, two major scenarios could be employed. The
first scenario involves docking the return spacecraft with a
If methods can be devised to allow transfer of viable Earth eco-
systems to a Mars orbit within Mars quarantine constraints.
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space station and transferring the sample to a special
laboratory in the space station for preliminary experimentation,
In the second scenario, the sample would re-enter directly
without undergoing the preliminary tests in space.
Selection of the scenario for experimentation
on the sample will clearly be a complicated function of the
assessed biohazard, the reliability and risk assessment for the
re-entry equipment, the effectiveness of the space and Earth
quarantine protocols, and cost factors. For technology
evaluation purposes, we can assume that a space station pre-
liminary test phase will be required, but that the biohazard
and quarantine protocol for Earth-based equipment will be the
same as for the direct re-entry case. This assumption has
the effect of including all the problems for either scenario.
In accordance with this philosophy, a series of biological
tests and physical as,says would be performed in the space
laboratory under strict quarantine conditions. The tests would
be similar to those for the cruise portion of the mission, how-
ever, the physical assay tests would be much more rigorous and
additional biological tests in the areas of inhibition reactions and
Earth ecosystem interactions would be conducted. On the basis
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of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory experience, these
tests represent a major technological challenge if a reasonable
quarantine protocol is to be maintained. This subject is more
extensively explored and discussed in subsequent sections of
this report.
s
Assuming the space data warrants Earth-based investigation
and the risk is assessed to be acceptable, the sample will then
be transferred from the space station to an Earth-based receiving
laboratory with significantly improved capability over the Lunar
Receiving Laboratory. Additional experiments requiring specialized,
bulky, heavy or cumbersome equipment will be performed under
very strict quarantine conditions. If a space station is used for
preliminary tests, the portion of the sample which re-enters
may be sterilized prior to its leaving the space station. How-
ever, we will assume that the presence or absence of viable
life has not been verified by manual experiments.
Finally, the sample will be studied, stored, disseminated to
interested scientific parties, and/or destroyed. The decisions
as to the protocol to be employed are strong functions of the
assessed risk, sterilization technology and life detection
technology. .
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3.0 DISCUSSION OF CRITICAL PROBLEM AREAS
In attempting to fit the technological requirements for a
typical Planetary Return Sample Mission to the existing technological
framework, we found three major generic problem areas: (1)
quarantine protocol, (2) life support and environmental control
systems and, (3) biohazard assessment and control. These
categories of problems are discussed.
3.1 Quarantine Protocol
The basic objectives of the Planetary Return Sample
Mission quarantine protocol are to prevent contamination of the
planetary environment with terrestrial organisms and to prevent
back contamination of the Earth by extraterrestrial organisms
or other hazardous material. The overall basis for planetary
quarantine was established by the International Council on
Scientific Unions (ICSU) and the Committee on Space Research
(COSPAR). COSPAR established a total limiting probability for
contaminating a planet throughout the entire space exploration
o
quarantine period as 1x10 . The quarantine protocol for the
Planetary Return Sample Mission will be established under the
auspices of the U.S. Planetary Quarantine Program which will
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allocate an appropriate portion of the total risk of contamination
to the Planetary Return Sample Mission.
The underlying philosophy of the Planetary Quarantine
Program in general, and the Planetary Return Sample Mission
in particular, is one of risk management in terms of statistical
probabilities. The approach (8) for analyzing the probability of
contaminating the Martian environment with terrestrial micro-
organisms has proceeded along the following lines:
1) Environmental extremes under which terrestrial
life forms can survive and grow are estimated.
NASA Ames Research Center has assigned
numerical limits to life-related factors of the
environment which form a basis for these
estimates .
2) The environmental conditions presumed to
exist on Mars at the landing site were studied
with respect to the data in 1) above. An
estimate of one chance in 100 is regarded as
reflecting the probability that minimum con-
ditions for growth of terrestrial micro-
organisms exist on Mars near the Viking
landing site.
3) The fraction of terrestrial microorganisms
surviving on the spacecraft which are
delivered to the Martian environment and
which will grow is then estimated .
4) All of the above considerations are com-
bined to estimate the probability of growth
and survival of a single randomly selected
microorganism which reaches Mars. The
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Q
estimates range from one in 10 to one in
10,000. The value one in 106 is being
used for the U. S. Martian projects .
In considering the reverse problem, that of contaminating the
Earth by a returning Martian microorganism, one is faced with
implementing a quarantine protocol under conditions where the
uncertainty in the first category above is very large. For
the problem of contaminating Mars with terrestrial life,' the
major uncertainty lies in the estimate of the Mars environment
at the landing site. For the back contamination problem, the
major uncertainties lie in the existence of a Martian organism
and its ability to grow in the Earth environment. If it can grow,
what impact might such an organism have on Earth ecosystems?
The data hopefully provided by a successful Viking program
will form a useful basis for assessment of these unknowns. How-
ever, the Viking information alone will probably be insufficient
to allow meaningful quarantine decisions to be made during the
Planetary Return Sample Mission.
The subject of biohazard assessment and control through
inhibitory actions is of such complexity as to warrant separate
treatment from the overall quarantine problem. However, the
Viking information which might be available for the Planetary
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Return Sample Mission is reproduced as Table 1 (5) to form a basis
for estimating the level of quarantine protocol likely to be required
as a function of various Viking results.
An examination of the Viking data possibilities reveals that
only for the two cases of positive biology and no inhibition do the
Viking data give a meaningful indication of the probable quarantine
decision. For these cases, the most probable decision is that
the risk associated with a return sample is too high to be accept-
able. Therefore, while the Viking data may alter the a priori pro-
bability functions for back contamination, the Planetary Return
Sample Mission will need to generate most of the required input
for quarantine decisions.
In any case, preparation of a suitable quarantine protocol
must consider the probability for life and the biohazard risk which
will be accepted without aborting the mission prior to return of
the sample. We assume that the only a priori condition which
would absolutely preclude the return of a sample would be the
known existence of life and the known ineffectiveness of selected
inhibitory techniques. The probabilities for the existance of
Martian life and for its growth on Earth are unknown. A prudent
quarantine protocol, therefore, must be able to cope with high
probabilities of both. Thus, a major burden is placed on the plan
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Table 1
Risk Factors
Viking* 75 Results Biohazard Risk Site
Life
Present
+
+
+
+
-
-
Organics Heat
Present Effect
+ None
+ Inhibits
None
Inhibits
+
-
Very
High . High Mild
X
X
X
X
X
X
Selection
High
X
X
X
X
Risk
Mild
X
X
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to maintain low probabilities for contamination of the returning
equipment and for accidental release of the return sample.
This situation is illustrated by the following equation which gives
a qualitative picture of the quarantine problem:
-
 PlPg I PC PS1 PD + PCL PS2
Where P is the total probability of Earth becoming
contaminated by a viable Martian organism
P. is the probability of a Martian organism existing
at the landing site
P is the probability that such an organism^could
survive and grow in the Earth environment
For detailed discussion of contamination statistics see
Judd, "North and Pezier, 'Assessment of Probability of
Contaminating Mars, '(9) and Schalkowsky and Kline,
'Analytical Basis for Planetary Quarantine. ' (10)
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P_ is the probability of contaminating the returning
equipment
PO, is the probability that such contaminating
organisms could survive the return trip
Pj) is the probability of delivery of such organisms
intp the terrestrial environment
PCL,is the probability of collecting a viable sample
P is the probability of survival for organisms in
the sample
P is the probability of accidental release of an
organism in the sample
An examination of the above equation shows the following
types of information necessary for meaningful quarantine decisions:
• What is the probability that the sample contains
or is contaminated by organisms which will
grow in an Earth environment? This data must
be acquired directly by the Planetary Return
Sample Mission experiments.
• What is the probability that any organisms pre-
sent could survive a range of environments to
be encountered as a result of sterilization
attempts, life support attempts and, naturally
occurring conditions during return and re-
entry? Again, this data must be directly
acquired by the Planetary Return Sample
Mission experiments.
In addition to the probability of back contamination, the quarantine
protocol will be influenced significantly by the risk assessment
associated with such contamination. For example, if it were
Final Report 1975
Contract No. NASW-2280
page 3.8
BIOSPHERICS INCORPORATED
known that inhibition by naturally occurring factors in the Earth
environment were negligible, the quarantine decision at a given
level of probability of contamination would differ from that if
natural inhibition were high. Similarly, if the Martian organism
were known to have an adverse impact on typical Earth ecosystems,
the quarantine decision would be greatly influenced.
The quarantine related problem can, therefore, be divided
into two broad categories: (1) biohazard control and assessment
techniques which are required to mechanize reasonable quarantine
-protocol decisions and, (2) physical mechanisms and techniques
for maintaining the probabilities of contamination and accidental
release within acceptable bounds. The biohazard assessment
and control problems are considered separately. The physical
mechanisms and techniques for controlling contamination and
release of the sample are discussed as follows.
The Lunar Receiving Laboratory experience (11,12) provides
important background for defining the physical containment and
quarantine problems. A brief description of the Lunar Receiving
Laboratory (13) techniques and accepted evaluations of their efficacy
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are given here to form a basis for discussing similar concepts
for Planetary Return Sample Missions.
The basic strategy for the Lunar Receiving Laboratory
involved vacuum sealing the lunar sample containers on the moon,
cleaning the exterior of these containers during the return flight
and opening these containers in large biological containment
systems in the Lunar Receiving Laboratory for scientific
investigation. These biological containment systems consisted
of large stainless steel glove boxes purged with nitrogen at less
than atmospheric pressure with the exhaust gasses passing
through an incinerator for sterilization. These containment
systems were later changed to a positive pressure system when
it was determined that the major contamination concern was
from the Earth environment to the sample. The system was
regarded to be marginally satisfactory for lunar materials and
completely unsatisfactory for a Planetary Return Sample
Mission where significantly higher probabilities of life exist.
Complaints against the biological containment systems fell into
the categories of biobarrier failure and contamination and into
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difficulty in using some instrumentation and operating through
the gloves of the system. The general consensus of the
evaluations of Lunar Receiving Laboratory for possible use for
Planetary Return Sample Missions are:
• The biological containment systems are
inadequate (11', 12).
• Much of the physical instrumentation is
not compatible with biological barrier
concepts in use (11,12).
Better quarantine protocols and experiment
design are needed to maximize the use of the
return sample. In particular, specialized
equipments requiring small samples and com-
patible with quarantine requirements are
needed (12) .
• Use of small, resealable containers which
can be easily sterilized offered major advan-
tages over the glove box systems (12) .
Much of the quarantine protocol was poorly
defined. For example, it was said to be
harder to get material from the primary
storage chamber to an analytical instrument
inside the Lunar Receiving Laboratory than
it was to take this same material outside to
a separate facility (12).
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This experience has served as guidelines for our consideration
of the Planetary Return Sample Mission quarantine requirements.
Detailed discussion of the physical containment and quarantine
protocolare contained elsewhere in this report.
3.2 Life Support
The life support problem may well be the most difficult
technical problem to be solved for the Planetary Return Sample
Mission. The problem is maintaining a suitable environment
for an unknown organism or group of organisms with unknown
nutrient requirements, unknown self-generated or interspecies
generated toxins, and unknown growth and survival mechanisms.
The Viking data may provide some useful information but, be-
cause of the limited tests to be undertaken and the limited time
span of the experiments, these data will not be sufficient to
design the system needed to support Martian microorganisms
during the return trip. For this reason, as well as for quarantine
protocol reasons, it is imperative that as much biological
information as practical be obtained as early as practical in the
mission. In fact, it may be possible to use much of this early
information to provide data for an adaptive life support system in
the return sample container.
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Two basic approaches to the life support problem have been
suggested. The first approach involves the use of hypothermia,
thereby reducing the life support requirements drastically.
The second approach involves measuring the properties of the
environment _in situ at the sampling site and duplicating and
maintaining this environment throughout the return voyage. This
approach may require that seasonal variations in the Martian environ-
ment at the sampling site be estimated and simulated on the return
flight.
On the basis of available information, it seems unlikely
that the low temperature approach can satisfy the total mission
requirements and that some active environmental control would
be required. Two major considerations point in this direction:
(1) the low temperatures regimen imposed may cause damage
to the organisms, and (2) the data required for quarantine pro-
tocol decisions could not be obtained during cruise at the low
metabolic rates induced. The life support problem will continue
after the sample has reached Earth and been placed in a receiving
laboratory for analysis. The strict quarantine protocol likely to
be imposed will significantly complicate the Earth maintenance
life support functions over that for terrestrial microorganisms.
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For these reasons, we assume that an active life support system
will be required for a Planetary Return Sample Mission.
An active life support system must include:
1) Some method for measuring the composition
of the atmosphere at the sampling site to
provide a baseline gaseous constituent pro-
file-
2) A method for monitoring the head space
gaseous composition in the sample return
container •
3) A supply of likely atmospheric constituent
gasses and a method of regulating the
supply to the sample, including a method
of maintaining the partial pressures of
the individual components and the overall
total pressure of the head space at Mars
ambient conditions •
4) A method of scrubbing out the metabolite
gasses .
5) Methods for sensing and maintaining the
desired temperature profile of the sample.
6) A supply of essential substrates and
nutrients and a method for maintaining
appropriate levels in the sample .
7) A method for controlling or scrubbing out
metabolite toxins.
8) A method for simulating the natural
radiation at the sampling site .
'This list of life support requirements is formidable when it is
understood that the measurements and control must take place
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in a remote manner and when interaction with the system by pro-
ject scientists must take place through limited communication and
command channels. It is even more formidable when one con-
siders that the system must function under a very strict quarantine
protocol.
The general subject of life support for a return sample has
received very little treatment to date. The results from the
Viking program should provide a major improvement in our under-
standing of the environmental parameters at a typical landing site.
A successful Viking program should, as a minimum, provide
baseline data for the atmospheric constituents, the soil com-
position, physical parameters such as temperature, pressure
and radiation input, and, if the biology experiments detect life, '
a first approximation to the nutrient requirements and
metabolites of Martial life forms. The Viking data could
remove many of the uncertainties as to the requirements of the
life support system for a return mission. The technical prob-
lems for implementing such a life support system remain and
some of the specific technical difficulties will be further ex-
plored in subsequent sections of the report.
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3.3
 : Biohazard Assessment and Control
The subject of biohazard assessment and control is
the third major area where a primary technological deficiency
exists, and this gap represents the most significant technical
threat to a potential Planetary Return Sample Mission. While
the technology for solving these problems is lagging, the
scientific concern for their solution prior to a return sample
mission to any of the planets is not. In addition, this subject
is certain to elicit considerable public opinion and reaction
in the future.
The overall subject can be broken down into the following
categories for fur ther consideration:
1) Life detection methods including assessments
of the reliability of these methods for detecting
exotic life forms.
2) Survival, metabolic mechanism, and adapt-
ability assessment methods including reli-
ability, estimates for exotic life forms.
• 3) Methods for measuring and predicting inter-
action of foreign microorganisms with the
terrestrial environment, and in particular,
terrestrial ecosystems.
4) Methods for sterilization and growth inhibition
of foreign organisms including exotic forms .
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Satisfactory solutions to each of these classes of problems in
probabilistic terms must be obtained prior to the return of a
sample from the planets. The degree of technical competence
in each of these areas and the confidence in the reliability will
have a major impact on the viability of a Planetary Return
Sample Mission and the quarantine protocol to be employed.
The rationale behind the biohazard data requirements
as a function of the mission phase for a Planetary Return
Sample Mission is discussed below.
3.3.1 Data to be Acquired at the Surface of Mars
It is likely that the experimentation to be
carried out at the Mars surface will follow the general line of
the Viking Mission though in a more advanced form. Two con-
flicting factors will determine the level of experimentation to be
conducted at the surface. On the one hand, the naturally
increasing probability for failure which occurs as the
mission progresses acts as a strong incentive to acquire as
much data as early in the mission as practical. On the other
hand, the weight and physical parameter constraints for the
lander, and particularly, for the ascent portion of the lander,
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act as major deterrents for complicated surface experimentation.
In addition, the desire to protect Mars from contamination by
live Earth microorganisms may limit or preclude certain kinds of
experiments, particularly studies of the interaction of Mars
biota with terrestrial ecosystems or life forms.
3.3.2 Data to be Acquired in Mars Orbit
After the sample has reached a Mars orbit,
many of the weight and physical parameter constraints of experi-
mental apparatus will be significantly relaxed. As a matter of
fact, the weight penality is smallest in the Mars orbit portion of
the mission. In addition, this portion of the mission is the
least restrictive portion of the mission from a quarantine stand-
point. These factors, in addition to the desire for early infor-
mation and the requirement for data for quarantine protocol
decisions, will combine to stimulate strong interest in performing
a rather detailed battery of tests on the sample before the risk
of the return voyage is committed. This risk is significant and
is comprised of two distinct aspects. The first aspect of the
risk involved in injecting the sample into a return orbit is back
contamination of the Earth considerations. Hoffman, et al (7)
at JPL have performed an analysis on the probabilities for un-
desired Earth impact of a returning sample. In their opinion, the
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total probability of impact on the Earth resulting from out-of-Mars
orbit injection errors and concurrent inability to make a corrective
maneuver will be about 10 for reasonable return trajectories.
Clearly before such an impact risk were taken, considerable
definition of the overall risk of back contaminating the Earth
will be required. Even if a sterilization capability is incorporated
into the sample return container, this information will still be
required since there would be some probability that the
sterilization system would fail. While this probability is a
function of the design of the system and in particular a strong
function of its failsafe configuration, it is not unreasonable to
o
expect such a failure probability to be of the order of 10 to
10""* and to be somewhat correlated to the guidance system failure
modes. Taking a value of 10 as reasonable and combining this
with the impact probability, we find a probability of the order of
10 that an unsterilized sample of Martian material will be de-
posited on Earth. Unless the sterilization system is effective over
the entire spacecraft, any contamination on the spacecraft might
still pose a serious problem. While it is recognized that the
return capsule could readily be designed to reduce the risk of
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actual contamination from this source, a significant concern can
be expected to develop as to just what sort of risk we would be
running as to the potential for undesirable effects on the Earth
ecosystems from such accidental release.
Several possibilities exist for. more accurately defining this
latter risk. The first level of information which can be obtained
using Viking-type technology (14) is an assessment for life. If
experiments such as the multiple release of nutrients (5) are per-
formed at least some information on the probable metabolic
mechanisms of any life present and detected could be gained.
Such information could be used to indicate the probable impact
on Earth ecosystems which might be caused by an accidental
release of unsterilized sample. Finally, a group of typical Earth
ecosystems (15) could be exposed to the sample under a range of
typical terrestrial environments and their reactions monitored .
Such experiments, taken together, could provide at least
a qualitative assessment of the biohazard represented by Mars •
sample material.
Experiments to determine the effects of various inhibitory
techniques will probably also be required (5). Such experiments
would shed considerable light on the probable seriousness of a
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quarantine breach and provide information as to whether and how
escaped organisms could be eliminated or controlled.
3.3.3 Data to be Acquired During the Return Voyage
During the return voyage more detailed infor-
mation on probable metabolic mechanisms, growth rate under
various conditions, and inhibition reactions can be obtained. In
addition, long-term effects on Earth ecosystems can be evaluated.
Such experiments can provide at least some information relative
to the incubation periods for any interactions with the ecosystems
tested and the long-term viability in typical terrestrial environ-
.ments (15) of any Martian organisms present.
3.3.4 Data to be Acquired in a Space Station
Laboratory
The subject of space station level tests for a
return sample has been extensively discussed and documented in
an AIBS study (15), mentioned earlier. The basic approach is
similar to that discussed for the Mars orbit and return voyage with
greatly increased detail and thoroughness and with the addition of
visual and electron microscope examinations. The tests were
estimated to require about 1> 000 square feet of space laboratory,
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a crew of five scientists and technicians, and a minimum flight
period per man of one month. Much of the equipment needed to
perform these tests in space must be developed.
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4.0 DISCUSSION OF CONCEPTS FOR KEY SUBSYSTEMS FOR
PLANETARY RETURN SAMPLE MISSION
4.1 .' Essential Subsystems
The following five specific key subsystems are
essential to a Planetary Return Sample Mission:
1) Sample collection capsule
2) Quarantine qualified docking mechanisms/
bioshield
3) Sample return container
4) Sample transfer subsystem
5) Analysis experiment containers for space
or Earth-based quarantine examination
Concepts for implementing these key subsystems are dis-
cussed in the following section in terms of the quarantine, bio-
hazard assessment and control, and life support considerations
developed in the first two sections of this report.
The first problem we considered was that of getting the
sample into a quarantined environment. Since the probability of
the returning spacecraft impacting the Earth accidentally is un-
acceptably large (7) it becomes necessary to keep the probability
of contaminating the spacecraft very small. Furthermore, it
is highly desirable for quarantine protocol decisions that some
means of verifying the quarantine status of the exterior
of the return spacecraft be provided.
Final Report 1975
Contract No. NASW-2280
page 4. 2
BIOSPHERICS INCORPORATED
In order to understand the conditions governing the sample
collection capsule, sample return container and quarantine
qualified docking, we will examine the events leading to docking
of the ascent stage with the orbiting return spacecraft. As stated
earlier, the ascent stage would be contaminated. We will now
consider how this contamination is likely to arise and mechanisms
by which it might be transferred to the exterior of the sample
return container and the return spacecraft.
The major potential source of dust is that raised by the
retro-rocket firing on landing. This is likely to stir up a con-
siderable cloud of dust particles of sufficient size to harbor micro-
organisms. In addition, the impact of the spacecraft on landing
and naturally occurring fallout from the atmosphere, frequently
supporting dense clouds of dust, will fur ther contribute to potential
contamination of the exterior of the ascent stage. Finally, of
course, the act of sampling, itself, will contaminate the sampling
mechanism and probably the ascent stage.
Faced with this situation, our first inclination was to
employ a discardable biobarrier shield to protect the ascent
vehicle from contamination. The bioshield would be
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jettisioned during the ascent at high altitude, with the spacecraft
spinning and with a slight positive pressure within the bioshield..
This technique could significantly reduce the potential bioload on
the exterior of the ascent stage.
Several apparent problems must be considered in conjunction
with this approach. The first problem arises in connection with
maintaining and verifying the integrity of the bioshield over
critical portions of the mission. The bioshield integrity could be
compromised by penetration by a micrometeorite during the
Earth-Mars portion of the flight. It might be damaged by a
mission malfunction or structural stress during Earth launch,
separationxfrom the orbiter, landing, separation from the lander
and ascent. Damage may also occur by unintended contact with
a deploying mechanism such as an antenna or sample collection
boom. If a source of pressurizing gas or biobarrier filtered
pressure equilization ports are not used, any loss of integrity
of the bioshield would result in a relatively high probability for
contamination of the ascent vehicle. Since the weight constraints
for the lander and, in particular, the ascent vehicle are likely to
be very restrictive, any biobarrier must be very light and, there-
fore, fragile.
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If a small container of gas were used to create a slight
positive pressure, the possibility for contamination resulting from
a minor break in the bioshield could be reduced considerably and
crude verification of the biobarrier integrity could be derived from
differential pressure measurements and/or gas flows. However,
if the hole were large enough to provide a significant path for con-
taminants, the gas supply would soon be exhausted. The weight
constraints again tend to reduce the attractiveness of such a system.
Finally, the perturbation constraints imposed by the
capability of the ascent control system may preclude jettisoning
the bioshield during the ascent at high altitude. Therefore, while
the use of a bioshield is attractive from a quarantine standpoint,
it may not be practical from a spacecraft design standpoint. In
the interest of responding to this possibility, we have considered
what might be done should it be impractical to use a bioshield on
the ascent vehicle.
If no bioshield is employed, it must be presumed that the
ascent vehicle surfaces are contaminated. Several mechanisms
could result in contamination of the return spacecraft during dock-
ing for sample transfer. Since the ascent vehicle would have been
exposed to Martian atmospheric pressure, the openings between mated
surfaces, along screw threads and the like will be pressurized. In
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orbit, this pressure will be relieved and will provide a source of
energy to dislodge particulate matter from the spacecraft. In
addition, the mechanical shock during docking and operation of
moving parts in the ascent stage or orbiter could further con-
tribute to loosening dust. It is likely that these particulates and
the spacecraft will have electric charges caused by interaction
with the atmosphere during the launch phase. Therefore, it
must be assumed that the ascent vehicle is surrounded by a cloud
of contamination at docking.
The problem then becomes one of docking the return space-
craft to the ascent vehicle surrounded by a cloud of contamination
without contaminating the return spacecraft. Our first consideration
was one of simply "waiting for the dust,to settle. " Certainly one
would expect that the amount of contamination being evolved would
be a strong function of time and further that the evolved contamination
would tend to disperse or be recaptured by the ascent stage with
time. Such a tactic does not, however, eliminate the shock at
docking or the possibility that a difference in electric potential
would exist between the ascent stage and the return spacecraft.
Therefore, while the policy of waiting would certainly reduce the
bioload which might be transferred to the return spacecraft, it
cannot be relied upon to achieve acceptable levels.
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A second possibility for reducing the contamination transfer
is the use of a discardable bioshield on the return spacecraft. The
weight constraints for the return spacecraft are much less stringent
than for the lander/ascent stages. In addition, the orbiter will be
thoroughly outgassed,thus removing one of the major sources of
energy for uncontrolled particle migration.
Finally, an electrostatic precipitator could be incorporated in-
to the docking mechanism to further reduce the bioload transferred
to the bioshield protecting the return spacecraft. The precipitator
might consist of a light-weight shield such as metalized mylar
connected in electrical opposition to a ring on the docking adaptor.
Prior to docking, the shield, which would extend back over the bio-
shield, could be polarized with a charge relative to the docking
adaptor and also with respect to the ascent vehicle after docking.
The bioshield could also be polarized with a like charge with respect
to the precipitator shield. By monitoring the current between the
precipitator shield and the docking ring/ascent stage , one might
obtain an estimate of the total contamination. Monitoring of the
current between the bioshield and precipitator shield might provide
an estimate of the load transferred to the bioshield.
Final Report 1975
Contract No. NASW-2280
page 4. 7
BIOSPHERICS INCORPORATED
.Figure 2 illustrates a possible configuration of the spacecraft
at docking. In order for an electrostatic precipitator to be effective
in preventing the particulates from reaching the bioshield, the polarity
of the charge on the acquired particulates must be known. The Viking
program may provide data on the induced polarity for a Mars launch.
The major problem associated with employing a bioshield
on the return spacecraft is designing the spacecraft and bioshield
so that the solar panels, high gain antenna, and control jet nozzles
are not required to penetrate the bioshield for their operation at
the time of docking. If a two-stage return vehicle is employed,
as now seems likely, this problem is .somewhat reduced (3).
In the following analysis , we assume a two-stage return vehicle.
The solar panels will be required to provide power for the
return mission since the undesirability of exposing the sample to
radiation weighs heavily against the use of an RTG power supply
(1) . The physical dimensions of the solar panels in the deployed
configuration will be relatively large and the panels must be exposed
to sunlight during the major portion of th'e mission. One could
perhaps envision a large transparent bioshield,such as a plastic
bag which could be deployed prior to erection of the panels. However,
such a shield would be highly susceptible to damage. A second
BIOSPHERICS INCORPORATED
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approach would be to use a bioshield which is deployed immediately
prior to docking. The solar panels could be retracted for the duration
of the docking. This may be desirable to prevent damage to the panels
during docking in any case. The approach has the further advantage
that the bioshield could be made of a light-weight flexible material
since it would be protected from micromete.oroid and accidental damage
through the majority of the flight.
A similar approach could be used to accommodate the high
gain antenna. However, the use of this antenna is likely to be
required during docking to receive commands and to transmit infor-
mation regarding the spacecraft status including quarantine-related
information, Fortunately, the antenna is relatively small so that
it could be enclosed by the bioshield during docking provided the bio-
shield were made of radio-transparent material.
The control jet problem is not amenable to this type of
solution. Since the gases must be expelled to permit the required
reaction, the nozzles must have an unobstructed discharge path.
Two basic approaches to the solution of the jet nozzle location
problem were considered. The first possibility is to let the jets
protrude through the bioshield and to perform a sterilization
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procedure on the nozzles at a point in the journey when the con-
tamination risk becomes low. This raises the possibility of leaks
at the nozzle/bioshield interface and requires the development of a
suitable sterilization procedure. A second and, in our view, more
attractive approach is to locate the jets on a portion of the space-
craft which remains in Mars orbit. This second possibility is
examined in more detail.
Because of weight restrictions on the ascent vehicle, we
assume that the major burden of maneuverability will be placed
on the orbiting spacecraft during docking and separation. Control
jets will be required for all three axes of motion and a larger
motor will be required to provide orbit correction for docking.
Similar capabilities will also be required on separation in order to
reorient the return vehicle prior to injection into a return orbit.
If the control jet nozzles were located on the first stage of the
return vehicle, this stage would not require bioshield protection
since it would not reach Mars escape velocity. A second set of
control nozzles would be required for the second stage return
vehicle for midcourse correction and for maintenance of
orientation during the return cruise. Since these nozzles need
not be used during the docking procedure, they could be pro-
tected by the bioshield during docking. The bioshield would
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then be jettisoned with the first stage of the return vehicle during
injection into the return orbit but before Mars escape velocity
had been achieved.
The bioshield configurations at various important times
in the sample transfer process are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.
The bioshield can be of light-weight plastic or plastic impregnated
fabric which is erected by inflating self-contained structural
tubes. The bioshield can be designed to unfurl so as to move
over the antenna without touching it. The seal at the second
stage can be effected by inflating a circumferential tube on the
aft portion of the bioshield. During injection, a similar circum-
ferential tube at the sample return capsule end of the bioshield
could be inflated to further unfurl this end of the bioshield to
establish the jettison configuration. A slight positive pressure
can be applied to the interior of the bioshield after it is erected to
minimize the effects of small leaks and as backup insurance that the
bioshield is not fouled on a spacecraft protuberance. Monitoring the
gas flow required to establish this internal pressure could provide a
measure of the bioshield integrity. Since the system is operating
in a vacuum, the gas requirements for erection and pressurization
will be small. During jettison, the internal pressure
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release would further act to prevent contamination transfer
from the bioshield exterior to the return spacecraft.
A scheme has thus been devised for protecting the exterior
surfaces of the return vehicle from contamination. It remains to
formulate a method of getting the sample sealed and into the
return spacecraft without contaminating the spacecraft. Jaffe
jit^ctl (1) considered this problem in a JPL study for a Mars
sample return. They propose a solution based on the use of
a double seal and sterilization of the space between the two
seals in the area of the entrance port. Figure 5 is from this re-
port and illustrates the procedure.
A major problem with this technique is that it requires
in-flight sterilization. Aside from the technical problems associated
with implementing in-flight sterilization, there is the concern that
such a sterilization technique may not really be effective since
it would not have been thoroughly tested against Martian life. A
primary objective of our study was to eliminate this requirement
for in-flight sterilization during sample transfer from the ascent
vehicle to the return spacecraft.
We have defined a transfer concept based on an adaptation of
a technique described by McDade(10)which we feel offers the potential
of an aseptic transfer and which does not rely on in-flight sterilization.
This technique is illustrated in Figures 6 and 7, and described below.
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Figure 6 illustrates the condition at docking. The sample
is contained in a transferable capsule for this discussion.
While this is not necessary for the described scheme, it will
likely be the case since many of the scientists desire that the
sample be sealed on Mars to protect its integrity. A flexible
biobarrier is incorporated as the connection between the bioshield
and the throat of the sample return container. Note that the
sample return container is also provided with a rigid hatch
which is protected from, contamination by the bioshield.
The first stage in the transfer is comprised of physically
moving the sample from the collection capsule in the ascent
vehicle into the sample return container and heat sealing the
flexible biobarrier entrance tube (Figure 7-1). The sample is
isolated from the exterior of the spacecraft. One might simply cut
the seal in two parts thus effecting the transfer, however, some con-
cern would remain that microorganisms trapped in the heat seal might
escape. This concern can be greatly reduced by proceeding through
a second stage of isolation.
To affect this additional isolation a secondary barrier is heat
sealed in place around the first seal (Figure 7-2). This barrier con-
tains the separation knives to cut the first seal. The first seal is then
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cut (Figure 7-3). The secondary barrier is then sealed (Figure 7-4)
to-form two compartments around the exposed ends of the first
seal. The secondary heat seal is then cut (Figure 7-5). Finally,
the rigid .hatch of the sample return capsule is closed and
sealed (Figure 7-6).
We believe that the above procedure could be implemented
within the constraints of a Mars mission and, by eliminating the
requirement for sterilization in-flight, offers significant advantages
over the JPL, technique. Even if surface sterilization is deemed
necessary as an additional safeguard, the low-heat capacity of
this type of bioshield would offer major advantages over typical
metal structures. The concept is compatible with most
sterilization concepts including:
• Heat sterilization of the biobarrier
• Heat sterilization of the spacecraft exterior
• Gaseous decontamination agents deployed
between the bioshield and spacecraft.
4.2 Summary of the Sample Transfer at Docking in Mars Orbit
1. The sample has been placed in the sample collection
capsule and sealed in a container.
2. A flexible bioshield is deployed around the second
stage of the return vehicle prior to docking.
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3. An electrostatic precipitator is used to
minimize the bioload transfer from the ascent
vehicle to the bioshield at docking.
4. The sample is transferred to the sample return
container using flexible biobarrier and heat sealing
techniques, thus effecting aseptic transfer without
in-flight sterilization.
5. The electrostatic precipitator and its collected
contamination are jettisoned with the ascent vehicle
at the termination of docking.
6. The biobarrier is jettisoned with the first stage of
the return vehicle during the initial phase of the
return orbit injection maneuver.
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4.3 Discussion of Sample Containment
In this section we will consider the problems of sample containment
We have broken the problem down into the following subtopics for discussion.
• Size of the sample(s)
• Contamination of the sample(s)
The objectives of the presentation in this section are to define
the problems, point out the implications for Planetary Return Missions,
and summarize the known information relative to these problems.
Concepts for solving these problems and definition of areas requiring
research and development are given.
4.3.1 Size of the Sample(s)
Jaffe et al at JPL (1) concluded that the minimum sample size
required for current technology is 50 grams; that a 200 gram sample was
highly desirable and caused negligible impact on the spacecraft para-
meters; and that biological and geological measurements on the same
sample are not feasible. Table 2, which is reproduced from the JPL
report, summarizes the sample size requirements as a function of the
science to be performed.
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A one liter volume of atmosphere is also very desirable for the
purpose of analyzing the isotopic composition of low-concentration
gases. Reduction of the atmospheric sample size by compression, cooling,
or adsorption in zeolite is said to be acceptable CD•
4.3.2 Contamination and Preservation of the sample(s). - Background Data
The JPL study (1) and a study conducted at Johnson Space Center (16)
also considered in detail the level of contamination of the sample which
could be tolerated without significant impact on the scientific results.
The following material is reproduced from the JPL study in accordance
with our desire to provide a self-contained summary of the information
relevant to preservation of a Planetary Return Sample (PRS).
Sample Handling and Preservation
1. Contamination of sample. The lander propellents should not
include any carbon compounds. Hydrazine, if used, should be
purified to remove carbon. As a design goal, there should be
no leakage or venting of propellants or stored gases on the
surface of Mars until after the sample is sealed. Continued
leakage is of great "concern; it might be better to flush out
lines quickly than to allow slow leakage. Undissociated
hydrazine and its compounds are of greater concern than
ammonia. One suggestion is to label nitrogen compounds in the
propellants with a few percent of Nl5, so nitrogen in the sample
could be identified if it came from the propellant.
There should be no outgassing of volatiles from spacecraft
electrical or other components on the surface of Mars.
Materials that contact the sample should be of high-purity
metal. For biology and organic analysis, materials that are
particularly undesirable and should not be allowed to
touch the sample include organics and water-soluble compounds
of the heavy metals. For geochemical examination, the con-
tainers (or its lining) should provide minimum interaction
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with the Martian gas, including catalysis of gas reaction, and
minimum transmission of gases, including hydrogen, by diffusion.
(The surface should not be activated during manufacture.) The
hydrogen loss, at partial pressures of 10"1 to 10~4 torr of
free H , should not exceed 5% in two years. The container lining,
scoop, and other sample-handling equipment should provide minimum
chemical contamination of the sample, meeting the limits shown
in Table 3. These limits may be waived for 1 or 2 elements
constituting the major elements, of the container lining, but in
any case not for Pb. The isotopic composition of materials that
may contact the sample should be known for the following elements:
C, N, O, P, S, Si. The material touching the sample should be
resistant to abrasion.
Table 3. Limits on Contamination of the sample
(based on a worst-case low-silica sample)
Element Contamination Limit
Si
Al, Ca, Fe, Ti
C, N, Na, Mg, S
Ag, As, Ba, Bi, Co, Cr, Cu, F,
Hg, K, Li, Mn, Mo, Nb, Ni, P,
Sn, Y, Zr
Rb, Sr
'Pb, Th, U
Ar, He
Kr, Xe
10 g/g of sample:
-410 g/g of sample:
10 g/g of sample:
10 g/g of sample:
10 g/g of sample:
-910 g/g of sample:
10~8 cm3STP/g of sample:
10~ cm3STP/g of sample:
Sealing. An extremely reliable vacuum-tight seal is essential.
The maximum leak rate shall be equivalent to 10~10 cm3/s STP of
He under a pressure differential of 1 bar.
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3. Temperature of sample. A goal should be to always keep the
sample temperature below -30°C. This is based on the terrestial
analogy that Antarctic microorganisms die if stored at -5°C for
several months, but survive at -30°C. (Additional work on this
question using Antarctic or similar microorganisms, is needed.)
It is recognized that maintaining this temperature may be
difficult. Accordingly, the following limits are proposed as
requirements:
(a) On Mars: at or below ambient temperature. This
necessitates that sample acquisition and handling
equipment be cooled to local ambient at the time the
unsealed sample is handled. The sample should not
be allowed to warm above the collection temperature
until it is sealed.
(b) In flight: below -30°C.
(c) During Earth entry and recovery:
Required: not to exceed +20°C
Highly desirable: not to exceed 0°C
Desirable: not to exceed -30°C
In any case, the time above -30°C must not exceed a
few hours.
If the aim of preserving biological information is deleted,
then the temperature is not to exceed +100°C, to prevent changes
in hydrated minerals and organics. Except for short periods,
the temperatures should not exceed +20°C.
4. Radiation at sample. As a design goal, the sample should not
be exposed to more than 10 rem. In general, minimal radiation
exposure is desired. A radio-isotope thermoelectric generator
on the return vehicle is highly undesirable. Otherwise, no
shielding is required.
5. Magnetic fields at sample. These should not exceed the Earth's
field.
6. Vibration and mechanical preservation. Sample particles should
be kept from rubbing against each other and against the container.
A plug, perhaps spring-loaded, may be used to maintain a small
compressive load. If a core is taken ("Enhancement", below),
its stratigraphy should be preserved. If two samples are taken
(below), they should be kept separate and identified.
7. Monitoring of sample during return. At the minimum, conditions
of the sample during its return should be monitored in the
following ways:
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Temperature; A thermal sensor on the outside of the sample
container, and a sensor recording the maximum temperature attained
on the inside of the sample container during the time that the
sample is within it.
Radiation; Undeveloped film ("film badge") to record the
integrated flux received by the sample after acquisition.
Pressure monitoring of sample container(s) for leaks may be
in handling problems of back-contamination and of opening the
containers after return. Such monitoring would not need to
be continuous.
4.3.3 Discussion of the Implications of the Sample Contamination
and Preservation Criteria.
In this subsection we will consider the implications for the sample
container of the contamination and sample preservation criteria.
4.3.3.1 Initial Container Cleaning and Sterilization:
The problems of initial cleaning and sterlization of spacecraft
components have received extensive treatment in various NASA programs.
Life detection apparatus has been addressed in the Viking program. While
there is some disagreement about the efficacy of the techniques against
all Earth life forms, we assume that these techniques and logical extensions
to be Developed in the period prior to a PRS mission are adequate to
meet the needs of the PRS programs.
The primary implications for the PRS containers are:
(1) the material and design should be compatible with
heat sterilization to 125°C (Possibly as high as
250°C if sterilization of the return sample is required)
(2) the materials should have low reactivity to the common
chemical and ultrasonic cleaning methods.
(3) the surface finishes of the materials should be very
smooth and the design should minimize small cavities
which are difficult to clean.
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It is probable that a long duration high temperature-high vacuum
desorption procedure will be required to meet the contamination con-
straints. A convenient reference for decontamination and cleaning is
provided by NASA's Contamination Control Handbook (.17).
4.3.3.2 Permeation of the Sample Container by Gases. .
" -v --v. ~ • '
In order to meet the desired hydrogen leak rate and the contam-
ination specifications for the rare gases, Ar, He, Kr, and Xe, the
sample container must be designed for low permeability and low adsorption
of these gases. Three separate and distinct aspects of the problem must
be considered.
(1) contamination of the sample by gases of the Earth's
atmosphere permeating the walls of the container.
(2) contamination of the sample by desorption of terrestial
gases stored in solution or adsorbed on the surfaces of
the walls of the sample container.
(3) the escape or adsorption of the sample through or into
the walls of the container.
The subjects of gas.permeation and adsorption and desorption have
been extensively investigated by technologists in the field of high
vacuum because these phenomena usually limit the quality of vacuum
attainable. The basic process of permeation which includes adsorption,
diffusion, and desorption of a gas in and on a container wall is illus-
trated in Figure 8. A gas molecule, initially free in the left half of the
figure, is adsorbed on the surface of the container wall. It enters
into solution in the wall and diffuses through the wall to the other
side where it is desorbed. Dushman (18) and Barrer (19) treat the process
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in detail giving the theory and specific data for many materials of
interest. Norton (20) summarizes the important results. It is our
purpose here to interpret the basic data in terms of the implication for
suitable materials and thickness for the PRS container.
The first problem we will consider is that of contamination of the
sample by gases of the Earth's atmosphere permeating the walls of the
sample container. This category of the total contamination problem is
of significance to the PRS technology because:
1. It may be desirable to store the sample for long periods
once it has been brought to Earth.
2. Through a non-nominal recovery, the sample might be lost and
later recovered thus inadvertently subjecting the sample to long
periods of storage.
3. In order to design the sample handling and storage procedures
it is necessary to have detailed knowledge of the effect of
various ambient conditions on the container and the ultimate
sample integrity.
Table 4 from Norton (20) gives the qualitative assessment of gaseous
permeation through various materials.
Table 4
Gas Permeation Through
(In all, rate an exponential function of temperature for true permeation)
Glasses
He. H,, D,. Xe, Ar. O5
measurable through SiO,
Vitreous silica fastest
All rates vary as pressure di-
rectly
MetaU Semi-conductors
No rare gas through any
meral !
H, permeates most, especially
Fe.
O, permeates Ag.
Hj through Fe by corrosion,
electrolysis, etc.
Rates vary as j (pressure)
He and H, through Ge and
Si.
Ne. Ar not measurable
HI rate varies as /(pressure)
Polymers
All gases permeate all
polymers.
Water rate apt to be hip.h
Many specificities
All rates vary as pressure
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Norton also considers in detail the gaseous accumulation in a
silica bulb of about the same size as our expected sample container.
Silica will be shown to be one of the important materials for the sample
container since it transmits ultra violet light. This data is useful
since it illustrates the process and provides a reference for other
materials. The atmosphere constituents and abundances in the standard
Earth atmosphere are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5
Atmospheric Abundances
N2
02
Ar
co .2
Ne
He
Kr
H
2
Xe
H 0 (50%RH, 25°C)
2
CH
4
0
3
N O
2
% by volume
78.08
20.95
0.93
0.033
l.SxlO"3
5.24xlO~4
l.lxlO"4
S.OxlO"5
8. 7xlO~6
1.57
2xlO"4
7xlO~6
5xlO~5
Partial pressure
(in mm)
5.95xl02
1.59xl02
7.05
2.5X10'1
1.4xlO~2
4.0xlO~3
8.4xlO~4
3.8xlO~4
6.6 xlO~5
1.19xlO+1
l.SxlO"3
5.3xlO~5
3.8xlO~4
.- •
Data from Norton C20)
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.These atmospheric parameters in combination with the specific
permeation rates are used to calculate the order of flow of the gaseous
-constituents into an evacuated silica bulb. The flow rates per unit
area are summarized in Table 6., and the total accumulation as a function
'-of time is illustrated in Figures 9 and 10.
We can convert the desired maximum contamination levels specified
in Table 3 to a form compatible with the data in Figure 9 to derive a
basis of comparison. If we assume a 200 gram sample and a container
roughly the size used in Figure 9, the specifications become:
—8 ^ fiAr, He: 10 cm STP/g -> 4.6xlO~9mm partial pressure,
- 1 1 3 - 9Kr, X: 10 ^ cm STP/g -*• 4.6x10 mm partial pressure.
Referring back to the data in Figure 9, we find that, if the container
were made of one mm thick silica, the contamination level of helium
would exceed the desired value in about one month-of exposure to the
Earth's atmosphere. The permissible exposure to an atmosphere containing
a high concentration of helium such as might be used for leak detection
or in conjunction with cryogenic equipment., would be very short.
The above analysis indicated that if silica is used in the sample
container construction, it should be held to a relatively low surface
\
area and be several mm thick to provide a sufficiently low helium per-
meation rate to meet the desired contamination levels. Further, if
silica is used, care must be taken to insure that the sample container
is not exposed to a high helium concentration even for a short time.
BlOSPHERICS INCORPORATED
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Atmospheric gis accumulation, 25'C, in a silica bulb. 330 cm1'vol. 100 cm2 area. 1 mm wall thickness. Log,, pressure
(in mm) vs. loglo time (sec).
J
Figure 9+
Gas Permeation through the Vacuum Envelope
HEUUM ACCUMULATION FROM THE ATMOSPHERE. 25°C
lh>. Ida; Iff. 100)1.
I /I , I ( I I
LIMIT
BULB
'330 cm* VOL
100 cm2 AREA
I mm WALL
Helium accumulation from the atmosphere in bulbs of different glasses. 253C- Log,, pressure (mm) vs. Iog,0 time (sec).
Figure 10+
Data reproduced from Norton (20)
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Metals are not permeable to any of the rare gases He, Ar/ Ne, Kr,
Xe so that in terms of contamination by these gases,metals offer the
best protection.
Helium permeation rates for.other glasses are illustrated in Figure 11
from Norton (20). While almost all glasses have lower permeation rates
than fused silica, they do not transmit as much ultraviolet light and
they are in general more sensitive to chemical attack and leaching of
metal ions. This subject will be more fully discussed in the section on
chemical reactivity.
PERMEATION RATES
COW3USTIO*
TUBING NQL 1720
-•Or
-,2
•15
-14
-IS
X - R A Y SHIELD
GLASS
CHEMICAL
PYREX NO. 7740
LEA080RAIE
800* 400* 200* IOC1
I.I ' .i __. •
.5 1.5 2.5 3
ICCC/T
3.5 4.5
Helium permeation rate P through various glasses. Units of P: cm1 gas (STP) per sec for 1 mm thick per cm1
area per cm gas pressure difference. Plot is log,, vs. 1000/T.
Figure il+
Data reproduced from Norton (20)
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The next problem we will consider is the escape or adsorption of
the sample through or into the walls of the container. If we assume the
container walls are either a metal or glass the major problem is to
prevent hydrogen from escaping or being adsorbed. Table 7 from Barrer
(19) summarizes the reactivity of metals towards gases. We note from
this table that the noble gases are not soluble in any metal.
In Appendix A, we show that the hydrogen leak criteria of not more
than 5% at partial pressures from 10 to 10"^  torr is equivalent to the
approximate permeation rates shown in Table 8 for sample containers of
interest to PRS technology.
The data in the table are computed on the assumption of a 1 mm
thick wall. The permeation is inversely proportional to thickness.
The permeation criteria in Table 8 are given in the various units
commonly in use. Note that the pressure differential under which the
measurement is made is important and that metals have permeabity which
is a function of the square root of the pressure differential while the
permeability of glasses varies directly with the pressure.
We have computed the permeation constant for a number of repre-
sentative materials from data given in Dushman (18) . Table 9 summarizes
these data at three temperatures. Typical storage temperatures of -30°C
and +25°C are considered and a sterilization or non-nominal temperature
of 125° C is also considered.
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Table 9. Hydrogen Permeability of Materials
Material Permeability: Log base 10
• • . - • • • • • • • ' P = 1
T = -30
Si00 -7.82
Ni , -7.9
Pt -12.0
Pd -3.8
Cu -11.5
Fe -5.3
Al -22.0
Mo -14.1
Zn
Cd
In
Tl
Rh^
Sb
Bi
Se
Te j
. Do
No
Do
atm, 1mm thickness,
°C T = +25 °C
-6.3
-5.7
-9.0
-2.0
-8.7
-3.7
-16.9
-10.8
not dissolve hydrogen
Permeation
not dissolve hydrogen
micron- liter
cm'2 min
O°C
T = +125°C
-4.8
-3.2
-5.7
0
-5.7
-2.0
-11.2
-7.0
but
form covalent hydrides
Computed from data in Dushman (18)
Permeating gas volume at 0°C. .
The values of permeability listed in Table 9 show that a large
fraction of the candidate materials for the sample container must be
eliminated on the basis of excessive permeation for hydrogen. We have
used these data in conjunction with other relevant data (18, 19, 21) with
respect to these representative materials to prepare an elimination
chart. The chart, in the form of a periodic table of elements, is
presented as Figure 12. A single line through the element indicates that
the material is unsuitable on the basis of poor high temperature properties.
A cross through the element indicates poor properties at storage temperature,
Two vertical bars plus one horizontal bar indicate that the material
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reacts with hydrogen to form hydrides. A Crosshatch symbol indicates
the formation of salt-like hydrides. An "E" in the upper right hand
corner indicates a material with particularly good properties. The
gaseous elements are indicated by a diagonal bar.
On the basis of the preceding analysis, we are left with a number
of materials which are known to have good properties with respect to
reaction and permeability of hydrogen; another group with less desirable,
but satisfactory, properties, and a final group with unknown but perhaps
useful properties. These materials are summarized in Table 10.
Table 10
Summary of Materials With Respect
to Hydrogen Reactivity and Permeation Criteria
Materials with known good properties Au, Zn, Cd, In, Te, Rh
Materials with known fair properties Ag, Al
Materials with unknown properties
but which may be satisfactory Ga, Hg, W, Re,
4.3.3.3 Chemical and Biological Reactivity
In our examination of the potential usefulness of materials for
PRS we compared the properties of the elements against the following
criteria:
1. The element must be inert under the range of electrochemical
conditions expected to exist within the sample container.
2. The element must be available in pure form.
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Figure 12. Rejection Criteria:
Reaction to hydrogen
Legend;
Forms salt-like hydrides
High permeation - all temperatures
Poor high temperature properties
Forms hydrides
Excellent properties
Gaseous element
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-3. The element must not be radioactive.
4. The element must not act as a catalyst.
5. The element must have low toxicity to earth, life forms.
We conducted our analysis by a process of elimination in stages
.^ beginning with the obviously unsuitable elements and progressing to
.more detailed analysis for each stage in the elimination process. A
-periodic chart of the elements, illustrated in Figure 13, formed the basis
for discussion of the interesting properties.
We were able to eliminate groups Vllb and O and the elements N and
O on the basis of their gaseous state at applicable temperatures. The
elements in groups la, Ila, and Ilia were eliminated because of their
very high chemical reactivity. The elements Fr, Ra, and Ac are also
radioactive. The Lanthanide series, 4f, was eliminated because of poor
chemical stability and/or lack of availability of the elements in pure
form. The Actinide series, 5f, and the elements Po, Tc were eliminated
since the elements are radioactive. Fig. 13 illustrates the elements
eliminated on the basis of this preliminary screening.
The next stage of the elimination process consisted of considering
in more detail the chemical reactivity and known toxicity of the elements
(22, 23, 24). The entire question of toxicity is a very broad and
difficult one since the toxic actions are diverse and dependent on
concentration in many cases. Brookes (23) and Bowen (24) have reviewed
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Figure 13. stage I Preliminary Screening
Radioactivity, Chemical Reactivity, Physical
X Indicates element eliminated from furtherconsideration
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the toxicity problem and give qualitative data relative to known toxicity.
We have listed an element as being potentially toxic if we found evidence
of toxicity for any life form. Figure 14 illustrates the elements elim-
inated on the basis of this more detailed screening.
The elements Ni, Pd, Pt, Rh, Ru, Re, Fe, and Cr are known to be
active catalysts and were eliminated on this basis.
In the next stage of our elimination process, we considered the
corrosion properties of the surviving elements from the standpoint of
their Pourbaix diagrams (25). The Pourbaix diagram is a graphical
representation of the reactions possible in a given system as a function
of the pH of the solution and electrode potential. The two sloping
dashed lines in the diagrams represent the upper and lower bounds of the
central region in which water is thermodynamically stable and cannot be
electrolyzed into hydrogen and oxygen. The Pourbaix diagrams for the
elements under consideration are reproduced (25) here for convenience.
We are interested in the electrode potential since a potential
difference between materials used in the container could arise from
differences in work function of the materials. Table 11 lists the work
functions (22) for the elements of interest.
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POURBAIX DIAGRAMS
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Table 11. Work Functions of Candidate Elements
Element
Au ;/
Ga
Hf
Ir . ''" i, '••/' ..>
Mo
Re
Si
Ta
Ti
W
2r
Work Function"1"
4.46
3.80
3.53
4.57
4. 08 - 4.
4.74 - 5.
4.2
3.96 - 4.
4.14
4.38
3.60
(eV)
48
1
25
*Data from (22)
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An examination of the Pourbaix diagrams reveals that many of the
elements noted for corrosion resistance are dependent on passivation for
their properties. The most common cause of passivation ,is the formation
ofca stable oxide coating on the metal surface. This phenomenon is
exhibited by Ti, Zr, Nb, Ta, Sn, and Hf which are really highly reactive
metals protected by an oxide film. If for any reason the protecting
oxide film breaks down, for example due to mechanical scraping, the bare
metal would enter into a reaction with the sample. In an oxygen rich
environment the protective film would quickly reform and heal itself.
However, in a planetary atmosphere lean in free oxygen, the reaction
might continue or other oxides might be reduced in the process of healing.
Since gold and iridium have a much larger range of true immunity
against reactivity and exhibit lower toxicity than the other surviving
elements, we believe they are better choices for the sample container.
Table 12 summarizes the suitability of the elements on the basis of
chemical and toxicity criteria.
Table 12.Suitability of Elements
Based on Chemical and Toxicity Criteria
Properties Elements
Excellent Au, Ir
Good (if passivated) Ti, Zr, Nb, Ta, Hf
Fair W
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Brookes (23) gives a detailed discussion of the chemical and biological
properties of the glasses. He finds the glasses to be satisfactory
materials for biological applications. Glasses are relatively stable
materials except under strong alkali action. Fused quartz is available
with very low impurity levels and for this reason, and its higher ultra-
violet transmission, we feel fused quartz has advantages over the common
glasses. Brookes notes that boundary surface effects do occur in which
some cations (H+) are removed from the silicic acid of the glass and
enter solution. This causes the glass surface to acquire a negative
charge with a diffuse region of mobile cations in proximity to the
surface. This then promotes an enhanced concentration near the walls of
specific ions from the bulk of the solution. As a consequence, there is
a propensity for life forms to migrate or grow into these enriched areas
and attach themselves to the walls.
,4.3.3.4 Summary of isotopes of potentially useful elements.
Table 13 summarizes the naturally occurring isotopes for those
elements which are potentially useful in the construction of a planetary
return sample container. We note that gold has only one naturally
occuring isotope. The requirements to know the isotopic composition of
any Si and 0 touching the sample could raise objections to the use of
fused silica or glass in the sample container since both oxygen and
silicon have three naturally occurring isotopes.
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Table 13. Naturally Occurring Isotopes of Candidate Elements
Element
Si
O
Au
Ga
In
Isotope Natural Abundance (%)
14Si28 92.21
14Si29 4.70
..Si 3.09
8016 99.759
8017 0.037
0018 0.204
O
79Au197 100
31Ga69 60.4
31Ga?1 39.6
49ln113 - 4.28
49ln115 95.72
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4.3.3.5 Summary of Material Selection Criteria.
Table 14 summarizes the properties of the elements, fused quartz,
and borosilicate crown glass with respect to the various selection
criteria.
4.3.3.6 Conclusions on Materials Suitability.
An examination of Table 14 reveals that only gold satisfies all our
material selection criteria. If we delete or relax the gaseous permeation
requirement, iridium can be considered. The use of fused quartz and
glasses requires a relaxed helium permeation criteria and either assay )
of the isotopic composition or relaxation of this specification. Plastics
and other hydrocarbons are eliminated since organic contamination of the
sample is very undesirable; other inorganic compounds were eliminated
because of the possibility that the compounds would breakdown under
extreme conditions and the difficulty of assuring high purity and
isotopic composition.
In contrast to these conclusions the Apollo program used teflon
bags for sample containment and aluminum and stainless steel for the
return container (26). The choice of materials was based on the easy
identification of teflon contamination and the desire to minimize gold
contamination .to satisfy one of the experiment objectives.
4.3.4 Discussion of the Sealing Problem for the Sample Container.
The maximum leak rate of the seal has been tentatively set at 10
cm per second, STP, of helium under a differential pressure of one bar.
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Summary of Material Properties
Key:
X Eliminated
P Marginal
E Excellent
G/P Good if Passive
Material
Fused Quartz
Borosilicate Glass
Actinium
Aluminum
Americium
Antimony
Argon
Arsenic
Astatine
Barium
Berkelium
Beryllium
Bismuth
Boron
Bromine
Cadmium
Calcium
Californium
Carbon
Cerium
Cesium
•
• ' ' • : • " . ' : ' • - J
~ • • • «
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• 8 i
• • O w
•H O
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. £ n
Symbol - . * SB
si
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Table 14 (continued)
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Key:
X Eliminated
F Marginal
.
E Excellent
- '. ' . . •
•
G/P Good if Passive
Material
Chlorine
Chronium
Cobalt
Copper
Curium
Dysprosium
Einsteinium
Erbium
Europium
Fermium
Flourine
Franc ium
Gallium
Germanium
Gold
Hafnium
Helium
Hoi ium
Hydrogen
Indium
Iodine
Symbol
Cl
Cr
Co
Cu
Cm .
Dy
Es
Er
Eu
Fm
Fl
Fr
Ga
Ge
Au
Af
He
Ho
H
In
I
' " £
..- ft . ' . '
B C 2 >io o «» **ft *H *» -r»
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« j e e « i - » j o i o - ^O K h u - H i a ^ n
• H O t Q I - H U O ^ OQ C^ Pu 6 "^ *^4* (d CU
>i o» x TJ -P e
. ' J3 CM fl) £ O «J <8 O
04 X S U t i t f O U
X X X
x x x
X X X X
P X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
x x
X X
X X X X
x x«» **
F ? ?
X X X
E E E E - E
x x
x x
x x
x x x
E F ? 7
x x x
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Key:
X Eliminated
F Marginal
E Excellent • .
G/P Good if Passive
Material Symbol
Xridium
Iron
' •
 :
Krypton
Lanthanium
Lawrencium
Lead
Lithium
Lutetium
Magnesium
Manganese
Mendelevium
Mercury
Molybdenum
Neodymium
Neon
Neptunium
Nickel
Niobium
Nitrogen
Osmium
Oxygen
Palladium
Ir
Fc
Kr
La
Lr
Pb
Li
i*
Mg
Mn
Md
Hq
MO
Nd
Ne
Np
Ni
Nb
N
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O
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5
'*• ' O O ~t&
«H «H 4> V
4* *• W >
• .. •;. •." . «a « -H o
O C C O -H (Q > OJ
, « H 0 ) f l J ^ H O O ^ O
.p P« fti 6 •»< -H flJ CU
> i Q ) X T » * J 6
/! M fl) £ O nj «3 O
VS « K 0 H .« 0 0
X X
i . • . • .
X • . X X
•* - - • .
X X
X X X
X X
. X X
x x
X X
' • " - ^ ' X X
X X X X
A A
. X X X
P F ? P
X X
X X
; X X
X X X X
X F X
X X
X X X X X
x
 :
 x
X X X
BIOSPHERICS INCORPORATED
Table 14 (continued)
Final Report^1975
Contract Nol NASW-2280
page 4.58
Key:
X Eliminated
. F Marginal
E Excellent •
G/P Good if Passive
Material Symbol
Phosphorus
Platinum ;
Plutonium
Polonium
Potasium
Praseodymium
Promethium
Protactinium
Radium
Radon
Rhenium
Rhodium
Rubidium
Ruthenium
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Scandium
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Key:
X Eliminated
•; '-• •"
• , P Marginal
• * ,
E Excellent
• - ' - ' • • ^
•
. * •
*
' G/P Good if Passive
Material
Tantalum
Technetium
Tellurium
• Terbium
Thallium
Thorium
Thulium
Tin
Titanium
Tungsten
Uranium
Vanadium
Xenon
Ytterbium
Yttrium
Zinc
Zirconium
Symbol
Ta
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Again, the field of high vacuum provides a technological base for
consideration of the problem. The state-of-the-art in ultrahigh vacuum
system seals is reviewed by Dushman (18), Wishart (2) and Hees (27). In
basic concept only two sealing techniques are used for the range of leak
- ' - *•' '
rates of interest here. •
The first (and most common) sealing concept involves pressing two
metal surfaces into intimate contact. Generally one of the metal pieces
is in the form of a knife-edge and the other a flat gasket. The knife-
edge is usually harder and deforms the softer flat piece to cause a very
tight, nonleaking joint. Leak rates as low as 10~^ 2 atm cm3/sec have
been reported (27). Figure 20 illustrates a typical configuration for the
knife edge/gasket seal. Figure 21 illustrates a sealing configuration
described by Wishart and Bancroft (2). This seal makes use of the
increase in diameter of the cup as it is deformed to create a knife-edge
seal against the inside diameter of the tube. ,Leak rates less than
-12 310 atm cm /sec. are claimed.
The other sealing concept in ultra-high vacuum use is the low
melting point metal seal. The seal is formed by the low melting point
material contained within the junction between the two pieces to be
joined. Figure 22 illustrates the basic concept. Several variations on
the general theme have been used. Milleron (28) describes a seal of
this type in which the sealing metal is maintained in the liquid state.
The surface tension of the liquid metal is sufficient to withstand full
atmospheric pressure across a gap as large as 10 cm. Two variations
are described in NASA's compilation of seals and sealing techniques (29)
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lut of LoK-Melting-Point Alloys Suitable for Use as Liquid-
Metal High-Vacuum Seals '
(Numbers in parentheses are references)
J
Metal or per cent
composition by
. weight of alloy
Gallium
Indium
Tin
.
Bismuth
Lead
62.5 Ga, 2 1.5 In.
16Sn(l)
62 Ga, 25 In,
13 Sn(5)
69.SGa, 17.6 In,
12.5 Sp (2)
76 Ga, 24 In(l)
92 Ga. S Sn(2)
~70 Ga,
~30 Sn(2)
49 Bi. ISPb. 12
Sn and 21 In
49 Bi. IS Pb. 15
Sn and IS In
(-0
32.7 Bi. 7.5 Pb.
16.7 Sn and
43.1 In(2)
49.5 Bi, 17.6 Pb,
11.6 Snand
21.3 In(2)
„
Melting
point or
rangeec
29.9
156.4
231.9
271.0
327.4
10.7(1)
~5 ,{5)
10.8(2)
15.7(1)
~20 (2)
~€0 (2)
57.8(4)
57.S-
69 (4)
58.S(2)
58.2(2)
1
III
Vapor pressure
mm Hg °C
.<10J(2) 500
<10-«(2) 500
<10-8(2) 500
<10-«(2) 300
<10-«(2) 350
<10-"» 500
•
-
IV
Surface tension
dyn/cm °C
735(2) 30-
40
340(2) 170-
250
526,,. 300
510C ; 500
376f0. 300
363^~} 500
422™ 350
431V"; 500
>500* 500
"
* Experimental.
1J. H. Hamilton, J. U. Lewis :md John P. Denny; Final
Technical Report, Physical Chemistry of Gallium-Indium Alloys,
XRO-421'*.
* LiquiJ Mftali H.in-.tbook (2nd ed.). XAVEXOS P-733 (Rev.)-
' R. L. Loftness; A Vapor Pressure Chart for Metals, NAAISA-
132, 1H52.
• * \V. H. Kohl; Miifrrixlt Technology far Electron Tubet. 1951.
» H. Spcneler; Z. MetalkundeAb, 464-467 (1«J55).
Table 15+
Data from Milleron (28)
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Jlll&i^ §>3
Inside Chamber
A V. Rotating Shaft
- Back Feeding Helix
Outside
Chamber
.High-Heat-Transfer
Metal Shape
"NS. Low-Melting-Point
Eutectic Metal
5 Inside Chamber
-To Heating Element
\ '. S\T T ^. High-Heat-Transff
X Rotating Shaft .>>V Metal Shape
^ r^ 'N,. Low-Melting-Point
Eutectic Metal
Nonrotating Static Seal
Slot or Hole ,d
Low-Melting-Point
Euteclic Metal
Door
Flow and Venting Hole-.
•To Heating Element
Atmospheric Pressure
Vacuum Chamber
Figure 23. Imus Vacuum Seal"1
N, Buffer Zone
Seal Blades
Eutectic Metal
Chamber
Figure 24. Halpert et al Vacuum Seal
Source: Seals and Sealing Techniques - A Compilation
NASA SP-5905 (02), Wash. D.C. 1970
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in which the sealing metals are heated to a liquid state by a resistance
heater when the joint is to be made up or dissassembled; otherwise the
sealing metal is allowed to solidify. Milleron (28) lists the properties
of the potentially useful metals and Table 15, reproduced from his
paper, summarizes the important parameters. Figures 23 and 24 reproduced
from (29) illustrate the two NASA techniques.
4.4 Life Support - A Set of Alternate Strategies
In studying the life support problem for a Planetary Return Sample
Mission, we were quickly forced to the conclusion that a range of alter-
natives must be considered. Three major factors contributed to this
conclusion. First, there is the obvious relationship between mission
and spacecraft complexity and the degree of sophistication possible in
the life support system. Second, all requisite information for designing
a comprehensive life support system is not currently available. And
finally, interaction between the life support system and the sample may
contribute a degree of uncertainty in the representativeness of the
sample after prolonged exposure which could alter the confidence in
experimental results.
In the following material, we have presented a general analysis of
the problem and considered a set of likely alternate stratagies which
could be employed.
4.4.1 Life Support - A Generalized Analysis
An ideal life support system would accurately maintain or simulate
the total indigenous condition of the sample including all interactions
between the sample and its external environment. The physical config-
uration of the sample would be preserved and a set of interface conditions
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and response dynamics would be constructed at the boundaries of the
sample accurately representing those which the sample would have expe-
rienced had it remained in situ. Figure 25 illustrates the problem. The
sample is considered to be a "black box" and the interactions are grouped
into those with the atmosphere, those with the planet's crust and
radiation.
The first problem we will consider is the need to preserve the
physical configuration of the sample, that is, the strata and surface
features such as small rocks, cavities, etc. should be maintained. In
an ecosystem occurring at the boundary between atmosphere and soil,
biological stratification is likely since a large gradient in conditions
occurs in the physical environment. For example, on Earth, aerobes
occur near the surface and the microbial population shifts in favor of
anaerobes with increasing depth in some soils. The forcing factor on
Earth is the drop in free oxygen content with increasing depth (30).
On Mars a similar gradient in carbon monoxide concentration"1" could
result in a similar population gradient. Phototrophs also decrease in
population with increasing depth and consequent reduced light levels.
Disruption of the natural gradient in population distribution could
significantly impact the balance of the ecosystem. A similar phenomenon
is known to occur in the case of tilling the soil for agriculture on
Earth.
A further argument for the necessity to preserve surface features
is provided by the diaphanous substrate phenomenon observed to play a
significant role in the ecology of desert soils. Cameron and Blank (31)
Wolfgang (3), Horowitz, Hubbard, and Hobby (4) have proposed CO as a
potential substitute for oxygen in Martian biology activity.
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describe the phenomenon in detail. Essentially two important factors
occur in conjunction with diaphanous, or light-transmitting, materials.
The first is the effect on the spectral distribution and intensity.
These transparent and translucent materials provide habitats or micro-
environments for organisms which otherwise could not tolerate the full
spectrum or intensity of the.radiation flux arriving at the surface.
Since Mars is believed to have an atmosphere which is transparent in the
ultraviolet, these microenvironments may play an even more important
role on Mars than the quite significant role they are known to play in
Earth deserts. The second factor associated with these materials is a
modified physical-chemical environment. For example, quartz stones in
Earth deserts have been found to act as a moisture gathering mechanism
(31). Changes in temperature and insolation have also been found to be
associated with diaphanous substrata (31). Finally, since these micro-
environments are favorable for certain species, organic matter tends to
accumulate there. This material enhances the favorable attributes of
the habitat by providing food, insolation, a higher moisture content,
and an increased ion exchange capacity for still other species (31).
We will now consider the necessity of simulating the radiation
input. The role of radiation from the sun in the photosythetic process
on Earth is well known. Wolfgang (3) and Horowitz et al (4) have pro-
posed a hypothetical Martian CO-CO, cycle which also depends on solar
radiation as the energy source:
. Photochemical:
0>2 h° * CO+0 eq 1
Biological:
2CO+H20 —MCH20) + C02
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In this hypothetical life giving cycle, the atmospheric carbon
dioxide is reduced to carbon monoxide by ultraviolet photolysis. If we
elect to screen out the radiation flux necessary to carry out the first
reaction, the carbon monoxide would be depleted by the ongoing biological
reaction. Of course, the question arises - when? And, unfortunately,
the answer is - we don't know. It depends on the rate of the second
reaction. Since reaction rates are temperature dependent, hypothermia
has been proposed to reduce the rate to such a low value that the bio-
logical population in the sample would remain unaltered during the
return trip and no essential ingredients would be exhausted. The
problem with this approach is that we don't know how low the temperature
must be to insure a low metabolic rate in all species in the sample,
and we don't know the impact of hypothermia on the subsequent viability
of the sample. A storage temperature of -30°C has been proposed in a
JPL study (1). However, algae, lichens, and conifers are known to carry
out photosynthesis at this temperature, and mold spores germinate at
temperatures as low as -44°C (32). The Viking experiments may provide a
rough estimate of the metabolic rate and process over a limited time
span. However, seasonal factors and altered environmental conditions
will not be tested, and the Viking data will probably not be sufficient
to answer the questions.
If the photolysis step of photosynthesis occurs in the body of the
atmosphere, as opposed to the boundary layer near the surface, even the
inclusion of simulated radiation may be inadequate since it is not
Final Report 1975
Contract No. NASKH2280
page 4.70
BIOSPHERICS INCORPORATED
practical to simulate the depth of the atmosphere in the return sample
container. An equivalent depth of atmosphere might be simulated in the
return container by increasing the pressure appropriately; however, in
doing so, we would run considerable risk that the abnormally high partial
pressures of the gasses might be toxic to life forms or substantially
alter the balance of ongoing reactions in the sample.
On the other hand, if the photosynthetic process occurs within
organisms in the sample as it does on Earth, the inclusion of simulated
radiation might be necessary to maintain the balance of the life cycle.
Another possibility is that the photosynthetic process occurs in
abiotic materials near the surface, in which case the simulated radiation
would also be necessary. In either case, the actual Martian spectrum
and flux cannot be simulated and leaves considerable doubt as to the
effectiveness of the simulator.
In summary, we are faced with three distinct possibilities for the
photosynthetic portion of the food cycle. Their implications for a
sample return mission are summarized in Table 16. One, two or all of
these possibilities may exist on the planet.
Table 16
Photosynthesis (or Photolytic step) Possibilities
Occurs in Requirements for Sample Return
1) biota in sample simulate radiation input
2) abiotic material in sample simulate radiation input
3) body of planetary atmosphere monitor and replenish essential
gasses, e.g. CO and CO
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We now turn our attention to interactions across the sample/atmosphere
and sample/soil boundaries. In addition to the CO-CO gas exchange
considered above, it seems likely, on the basis of present information,
that water vapor is given up to the atmosphere and replenished from
underlying permafrost or juvenile sources. If this process exists, it
could be an important mechanism for ion exchange as well as a source of
water for biological activity. The question of water availability has
sparked considerable controversy and remains as perhaps the largest
single factor in arguments against the likelihood of Martian life.
Recent experimental results from Vishniac and Hempfling (33) have
pointed out that life can and does exist and grow on Earth in areas
previously reported to be unable to support life because of lack of
available water.
If the upwelling of water or water vapor from deeply buried perma-
frost occurs on the planet, 'and if this phenomenon is important to the
life forms there, it would be essential to simulate this phenomenon in
the sample during the return trip. In addition to water and water
vapor, the possibility of other chemicals diffusing through the soil
from underlying reservoirs and subsequently reduced within the biota can
not be excluded. Kuzyurina and Yakshina (34) find the possiblity of
"osmophilic life forms" within the bounds of reason and the available
information.
In summary, one can easily imagine biologically important trans-
actions occurring across the boundaries between the sample, the atmosphere
and underlying soil. Unfortunately, we have no significant information
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about the nature of such interactions at present. Further, while we can
expect some elucidation of these points from Viking data, it is likely
that much of the mystery will remain at the time the first sample is
collected for return to Earth.
Finally, we will consider the physical/chemical parameters within
the sample volume. These include temperature, pH, Eh, and metabolite
concentrations. Temperature and temperature gradients are known to play
a role in desert biota. For example, at night-fall the relative humidity
in the desert air increases dramatically. A corresponding decrease in
the planetary atmosphere's "thirst for water" might be important to the
life processes going on there. For example, the biota may carry out
certain processes which involve the risk of losing water to the environ-
ment at these times. Differences in heat conductivity and heat capacity
of the sample container from those of the natural environment make
simulation of the thermal pattern very difficult. It seems likely that,
while the average temperature pattern could be simulated in the return
capsule, the gradients, profile across the sample, and dynamics will
depart significantly from the in situ situation.
The pH, Eh, and metabolite concentrations in the sample may also be
difficult to simulate. Naturally occurring factors such as soil percu-
lation, evaporation, wind blown removal and deposition of the surface
layer, and ion exchange will not be adequately simulated in practical
sample return systems. One can imagine at least some of these parameters
being monitored and the balance within the sample corrected at least on
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an average volumetric basis. However, when the quarantine constraints
and the desire to maintain the sample in a pristine state are considered,
the practicality of adjusting these parameters in flight becomes ques-
tionable . .
4.4.2. Life Support - Alternate Strategies
As we have seen, an "ideal" live support system would control many
parameters, of which a number are yet to be identified, and those
identified are not fully understood. Extensive monitoring and corrective
instrumentation and mechanisms would be required. The inclusion of some
of these control systems requires interaction with the sample in ways
which involve a risk that the sample would be contaminated or altered as
a result of addition of nutrients, removal of metabolites, and the like.
Further, because of inaccurate or inadequate information, the life
support system could kill all or a portion of the biota present, or
alter the balance of life forms, in ways which'could be very confusing
to scientists in their attempts to reconstruct the orginal situation.
The conflict between the requirements and risks associated with a
life support system is, perhaps, most evident when the organic chemistry
of the sample is considered. Viewed from an organic chemist's eyes, the
life support function is primarily a risk, a risk that the sample will
be altered or contaminated, which must be weighed against relatively low
probability benefits. From a biologist's viewpoint, however, the life
support function is paramount.
It is important that these rather basic differences in risk-reward
functions for the various sciences be reflected in the life support
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strategy adopted for the sample return. In the following material, we
will consider a number of alternate strategies ranging from a simple gas
tight cannister with spacecraft ambient temperature control to quite
sophisticated life support systems. It is our view that the overall
mission strategy will encompass a divided sample concept with different
life support strategies employed as a function of the intended use of
each sample portion.
4.4.2.1 Strategy A - Containment
This strategy is one of simple containment. The sample, either in
I
the form of loose fines, as recommended in the JPL study referenced
earlier (1), or in the form of a core sample with strata preserved, is
loaded into the container. The container is then sealed, transferred to
the return sample quarantine capsule in the orbiting spacecraft and
returned to Earth. The temperature profile of the sample during the
return trip is determined by the spacecraft ambient conditions.
The basic goals of this strategy are:
(.1) to prevent contamination of the sample.
(2) to preserve or confine all of the sample constituents to
the sample container.
Such a strategy must be recognized to have the following explicit
limitations:
(1) Life forms may autosterilize or species populations may
be altered due to exhaustion of substrates and nutrients or due
to changes in critical environmental factors such as
radiation input, temperature, diurnal cycling of various
parameters and the like.
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(2) The organic chemistry of the sample may be altered by
an induced change in a biological component, or lack of
a critical factor such as radiation input or ion exchange
with the atmosphere or underlying soil.
(3) The organic and inorganic chemistry of the sample may
be altered due to major departures from the nominal
in situ temperature/humidity profile.
To implement this strategy, the sample container must also satisfy
certain mission and spacecraft design constraints. Among these are:
(1) The sample container design must be compatible with remote
loading and sealing of the sample in the container.
(2) The design and its associated loading and sealing mechanisms
must result in minimum weight and power requirements partic-
ularly with respect to the return planetary lift-off weight.
(3) The design must be compatible with the quarantine and bio-
hazard control strategy adopted for the mission.
We note that this sample containment strategy places certain
limitations on the biohazard control strategy in that no monitoring of
the sample or biohazard assessment measurements are included. In short,
this strategy represents the absolute minimum approach which might be
compatible with any reasonable quarantine and sample preservation
program.
Figure 26 illustrates a design concept which we believe would satisfy
the requirements of this sample containment strategy. All components of
the container are pure gold except the outer sealing ring which has an
alloyed edge for better sealing. During the loading process, a loading
chute, or funnel, is envisioned to prevent dust particles from settling
on the sealing areas of the cup. The lid portion of the. container-would
be protected during the loading process. The seals are knife-edge type
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seals as described by Wishart and Bancroft (2). A double seal is used
for improved reliability. The lid is held to the cup by a simple breach
block thread requiring only a few degrees rotation for setting. A
spring loaded pin, or other mechanism, can be employed to provide a
positive lock when the cap is installed. The container cup includes a
spring loaded compaction plate to prevent the sample from self com-
minution during the return trip and reentry. The outer seal could be
soldered using a low melting point alloy such as indium, however, the
advantages to be gained are probably more than offset by the complexity
of the soldering operation, the thermal stress imposed on the sample,
and the problems such a system might cause during the spacecraft ster-
ilization procedure prior to Earth launch.
4.4.2.2. Strategy B - Simple Containment Plus Hypothermia
This strategy represents an extension of STRATEGY A to include
hypothermia to retard chemical reaction rates1 and biological metabolism
during the return voyage. The goals of the strategy are:
(1) to prevent contamination of the sample.
(2) to preserve the contents of the sample.
(3) to preserve the chemical, biological, and physical status
of the sample by retarding the on-going processes through
the imposition of a low temperature regimen.
*,
The strategy must be recognized to have the following explicit limitations;
(1) Although the probability would be significantly reduced in
the low temperature environment, life forms may autosterilize
and species populations may be altered because of exhaustion
of substrates and nutrients or the absence of a critical
environmental factor such as radiation input, temperature
cycle, etc.
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(2) The organic chemistry of the sample may be altered
due to an altered biological component or environ-
mental factor such as radiation input or ion exchange.
In addition to the above life support limitations, the strategy
does not provide for monitoring or biohazard assessment measurements on
the sample. The strategy retains the ease of remote loading and sealing
of STRATEGY A, but requires additional weight and power for the thermal
control systems.
Figure 27 illustrates a design concept which we believe would satisfy
the requirements of this sampler-containment strategy. The sample can-
nister is identical to that depicted in Fig. 26. Thermal control is
provided by a thermoelectric cooler which serves as a mount to hold the
sample cannister inside the return quarantine capsule. While definition
of the exact mechanism for providing the heat pump is not critical, we
have illustrated a thermoelectric unit after considering alternatives
such as Joule-Thompson coolers, refrigeration units, and passive radiators
to deep space. The passive radiation technique has been employed with
fair success in previous military space missions, however, it is felt
that the design of a system which would meet the quarantine and weight
restrictions for a planetary return mission would be very difficult.
The Joule-Thompson cooler requires storage of an unreasonable amount of
gas with attendant weight problems. The thermoelectric cooler has
weight and reliability advantages over a conventional refrigeration
unit. We estimate the cooling capacity required for the illustrated
design to be about 0.5 to 1 watt against a temperature difference of 50°
to 70°C. We note that this heat load is near the current state-of-the-
art for thermoelectric coolers.
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4.4.2.3. Strategy C - Containment with Temperature Control and
Simulated Radiation
This strategy represents the first step toward an active life
support system. The goals of the strategy are:
(1) to prevent contamination of the sample.
(2) to preserve the sample constituents.
(3) to maintain any biological activity by simulating the
thermal pattern and radiation flux of the habitat.
The strategy has the following explicit limitations:
(1) If the photosynthetic component of the life cycle occurs
in the bulk of the atmosphere, the radiation input provided
would not adequately simulate in situ conditions since an
equivalent atmospheric depth cannot be provided. In this
case, the biological component could be adversely affected
by exposure to the nominal thermal cycle without regen
eration of nutrients.
(2) The organic chemistry of the sample may be altered by a
changing biological component or lack of a critical
environmental factor such as ion or water exchange with
the atmosphere and underlying soil.
(3) Biological activity may be modified by lack of a critical
factor related to interactions with the underlying soil
or bulk of the atmosphere..
(4) An increased container complexity and materials thermal
coefficient matching problems introduce greater uncertainty
in our ability to prevent contamination or escape of the
sample through gaseous diffusion and small leaks. These
leak possibilities are not believed to be significant
• from a quarantine standpoint since the sample cannister
will be enclosed in an isolation capsule which will
provide the quarantine barrier in any case.
The incorporation of a light source in the sample cannister design
problem gives rise to a number of difficulties. Figure 28 illustrates
schematically what we would like to be able to do. Unfortunately two
complications must be resolved:
.5.. Final Report 1975
Contract No. NASW-2280
4.81
PROBLEMS:
: (l) KiO GxRfWlTY - SAKAPLt D\SP6.RSE.S IM
COtFFlClE'T M\SKAPvTCH
: : WINDOW MOUMT
H He D\PFUSl'OVi
LAMP BANK
n
9
LZ
R
in MS,I \ . ^ v \
X •
SAMPLE
/ //
^JjUA
' V
•\
•WINDOW
SAMPLE
CONTWME.R
FIG, 28 DESIRED CONFIGURATION
Final Report 1975
Contract No. NASW-r2280
page 4.82
BIOSPHERICS INCORPORATED
(1) The lack of gravity would result in the sample being
dispersed in a more or less uniform manner inside
the container.
(2) The wide temperature range necessitated by the spacecraft
sterilization procedure and simulation of planetary night
time conditions (250 to -60°C approximately) coupled with
a mismatch in thermal coefficients of expansion between the
container walls and the window material results in a very
difficult sealing problem.
The first complication can be resolved more or less satisfactorily
by placing the window against the top of the sample and relying on
gaseous diffusion through the soil for circulation. Opaque spots in the
window could provide shadowed habitats in the sample. The diaphanous
action of the larger particles and pebbles would remain unimpeded.
The problem caused by the thermal coefficient mismatch between the
container and window is not so easily solved. Mounting the sample on a
substrate which is used to cycle the temperature of the sample during
the return voyage, while having the cannister and window at spacecraft
ambient temperature, would significantly reduce this aspect of the
problem, but the spacecraft sterilization temperature excursions would
remain. The window could be held loosely in a circumferential slot in
the cannister wall but this would result in an unacceptable "seal".
Finally, this later approach could be combined with the inclusion of the
lamp within the sample cannister as illustrated in Figure 29. We are
still left with the problem of getting electrical connection to the
lamp. The problem then becomes one of designing an adequate electrical
feed through. :
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Figure 29 illustrates a design concept which at least in theory
provides a mechanical solution. The leads are kovar and are bonded to
the sealing cup by glass insulators. The kovar cup is sealed to the
container by a knife-edge type seal which can accomodate differential
changes in diameter by springing the cup similar to the action of the
Wishart and Bancroft (2) seal. Note, however, that we have been forced
to use materials which do not satisfy the requirements of low gas perme-
ability and chemical inertness. Since the kovar is separated from the
sample by the window, bulk reactions with the sample will not occur.
Some interaction with the atmosphere is possible, however. Hydrogen
permeation could perhaps be reduced to an acceptable value by gold
plating the kovar cup and keeping its area small.
An alternate design approach which deserves consideration, if the
hydrogen permeation specification can be relaxed for the biological
portion of the sample and if the Viking data or other results indicate
that kovar, etc. would not cause significant catalysis or react with the
atmosphere, is to make the container out of, say, kovar and protect the
bulk of the sample by placing it in a gold cup pressed against the
window.
In either case, it is evident that a substantially greater risk of
contaminating or allowing portions of the sample to escape is associated
with this strategy as opposed to STRATEGIES A or B. For this reason we
rate this strategy of low value for the portions of the sample destined
for use in inorganic, isotopic, atmospheric and possibly organic analysis.
The strategy does deserve serious consideration for the biological
portion of the return sample.
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4.4.2.4 Sample Headspace Gas Exchange
On the basis of our present knowledge, it seems likely that gas
exchange between Martian biota (if extant) and the Martian atmosphere
would be important to the life process. It is generally assumed that
the elements carbon, oxygen, nitrogen and hydrogen play essential roles
in likely forms of Martian biology. On Earth, gas exchange with the
atmosphere is involved in the utilization cycles for each of these
elements. Unfortunately, our very limited knowledge of Martian conditions
and biota (if present) restricts us to speculation as to. the detailed
mechanisms such gas exchange would take on Mars. However, in keeping
with our desire to provide a link between exobiologists and spacecraft
engineers involved in TPR, we will give a brief description of what is
known to happen on Earth and a few speculations about what might be
going on in a Martian environment.
The carbon cycle provides a good illustration of the importance of
gas exchange and lies at the heart of the life process. The carbon
cycle is illustrated schematically in Figure 30. The atmosphere pro-
vides a reservoir of carbon in the form of carbon dioxide at relatively
low concentration (about 0.03%). Green plants and algae fix the free
C0_ from the atmosphere according to the simplified reaction:
C
°2 + H2° hO ^ (CH20) + 02 eq 3
In addition, certain soil bacteria fix atmospheric CO by an anaerobic
reaction which does not result in the liberation of oxygen and which
does not require water as the electron donor. These soil bacteria
commonly use molecular hydrogen, reduced sulfur compounds, or organic
compounds to play the role of water in the above reaction. A typical
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photosynthetic reaction is illustrated by the metabolism of the green
sulfur bacteria as given by the following reaction C35) :
C
°2 + 2H2S - - ^  (CH20) + H20 + 25 eq 4
Another interesting reaction exhibited by many purple bacteria is (35) :
hv>C02 + 2H2 . - - - ^ (CH20) + H20 eq 5
Reactions such as the two above are of significance since they at least
partially circumvent one of the major arguments against the probability
of life on Mars, that is, the lack of liquid water in the environment.
One might imagine- that Martian biota could manufacture the water which
might be required as a solvent with the cell.
The other half of the carbon cycle involves degrading the organic
matter back to carbon dioxide which is liberated to the atmosphere
thereby completing the cycle. Higher animals, plants and many micro-
organisms accomplish this through a process known as aerobic respiration.
Free oxygen from the atmosphere reacts with organic matter according to
the following simplified reaction:
°2 + (CH20) - *" C02 + H2° + ener9Y eq 6
Which, in the case of glucose, is usually written:
6O_ + C^H, JD^ - *- 6 CO. + 6 H^O + energy eq 7£ b 1 . 2 b 2 2
However, many soil microorganisms also exhibit anaerobic respiration, a
process which does not require free oxygen from the atmosphere. A
comparable anaerobic metabolism of glucose can be represented by the
following reaction:
^.-.
 0b \.f. b 22C 0 + 2 C_HCOH -f energy eq 8
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On Earth, the photosynthesis provided by green plants and algae
-dominates due to their abundance and the reaction given in Equation 3
has progressed until the concentration of CO in the atmosphere and the
available light limit the process. Consequently, the balance of gas
constituents in the atmosphere reflects a high proportion of oxygen and
relatively low CO concentration.
If we look more closely at the soil microorganisms on Earth, we
find that organisms have developed which can live in our harshest
environments and which show remarkable diversity in obtaining food. A
large number of photosynthetic and chemosynthetic bacteria have been
identified which can manufacture nutrients from inorganic compounds.
Table 17 from (36), lists a number of autotrophic bacteria and gives data
relative to their metabolisms. An even larger variety of heterotrophs
are available for breaking down practically any organic molecule
including many which are not found in nature. Lichens, a symbiotic
relationship between algae and fungi, are a miniature ecosystem in
themselves.
A number of investigators have studied the gas exchange occurring
between Earth soil samples and a simulated Martian atmosphere. For
purposes of our discussion, we will use data reported by Oyama (.37)
since the data to be obtained by Viking will be determined by this
investigator using the methods reported. Table 18 lists a number of
soil samples tested and the headspace gas changes in nanomoles for the
constituents H , N , CH , CO and NO. The gas data is for a 0.1 cc
£ . £ . * * * . , * •
sample from the containers which had a headspace volume of 8 cc and
contained 1 cc of soil suspension. The initial atmosphere was composed
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Table 17
A.ulo trophic bacteria
Photosynllietie types:
1. Purple, t tu l fur l):iol(>ri:i (Thiurhmlnccac, Molisch) lumrrohic, develop readily in IISS media, and oxidize inorganic aul fur com-
pounds to sulfate with reduction of CO2. II2S can be replaced by certain hydrogen donutors, e.g., lower fatty acids, dibasic acids
or molecular hydrogen. Growth factors not required.
2. Purpln, non-sulfur bact.oria (Athiorhrxlaccnc, Molitich). Organic substances and molecular hydrogen serve as II2-donators;
COz reduced. Growth factors required. Certain species oxidize inorganic sulfur compounds..
3. Green bacteria (Chlorobacteriaceae, Geitler and Paschcr). Occur in H:S media. CO« reduced, H»S being oxidized to free S
which is usually deposited outside the organisms. Growth factors not required.
Clicmosynthclic types:
HAKE
ffitrosomonas, Nitrosococcus. .
Begyiatoa, Thiothrix, Thio-
ploca
Thiobacillus thioparvs
Thiob<tcillyft novclltis
%'hivbocitins lltwoxidons .....
TliiobftciTlus dcnitrificans. .
Thinliacillits fcrronridans
Carboxyiloinonas oligocarbo-
phila*
Mclhanomonas melhanica]
Didymoliclix,\ Sidcronomas,
L/cptolhrix CrcnothTix
N SOUECE
NH/
NO--
NH,+
NII«+, NOr
KHi+
NH,+
NH4+
NIT/, NOr
Nir,1-
Nil/
NH,+
NII«+
c
COj
CO-
C02
COZ
CO-
COi
CO-
CO.
COj
CO
C02
co-
E.VEKCY SOD
Osidaliun of
NH,+
NO-
HjS
H-S, SzOr S
s-or
s, s-or
s
Fe-*-, S20r
11.
n., co
CII4
Fe++, Mn"1-*-
BCE
Kcilucli'm of
COZ, Oi
CO2 Oi
COz, Os
CO2, O2
CO-, Oj
CO-, O2
COj NOa~
C02, 02
CO-, O-
CO2, O-
COj, 02
CO.
ADTOTKOPBISU
Obligate
Obligate
Obligate (Facultative?)
Obligate
Facultative
Obligate
Obligate
Obligate
Facultative
Facultative
Facultative
Facultative and obligate
Ot-iELATioxsarp
Aerobic
Aerobic facul
Aerobic
Anaerobic facul
Aerobic
Aerobic
Aerobic
• Has ,'ilso been called Acliiinmyr.c.s nliyocarbojihiln. •
\ C'hango of uanio lo I'sciuluniunius >nclliiiii.n:u ha.s boon .
J Diiliimohclix is now the genus Gallionclla in Bcrgey's seventh edition.
(Adapted from Workman and Wood, 1942)
Reproduced from (36)
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Table 18
OAB CovfOsmoHAi CHAXQES at rnc ATUoartiEiis OVBR Sort vrrra DASIC Coimxx MEDIUM*
Cyotol Cyrlol
CM (mAX) Uo*(Mul)
Soil
Antwcttca 600
BV1S
•
pvas/i
*
Oy»CTvfflo# c
Aifen
. Boron Clay i? 4
ilnporia.
Holtvillo
Fenocho
RamanA
Salmon Loom
Eiakiyoa
Volo
Suiten I*liwi(l
Pcalty Muck
Tu>oL.k»
Wudcen*
Co.
H,
X,
Cll,
CO,
K.O
11.
K,
Cll,
CO,
K,0
H,
K,
Cll,
CO,
•VJU
Hi
K,
CM,
CO,
v*>
H,
K,
CH,
CO,
XtO
H.
Ni
or.
CO,
K.O
ii,
K.
CH,
to,
.K,0
H,
Ns
CH,
CO,
N.O
H,
K,
CH,
CO,
N]0
H>
N,
CH,
CO,
N,0
H>
K|
Cll,
CO,
NiO
H.
K,
f'lltril4
CO,
N,0
HI
Kl
CH,
CO,
K,0
Us
Xi
CH, •
CO,
KM
H.
Kl
/'I/*«-»l4
CO,
mo
H»
K»*M
f II •Cll,
4.1),
N»0
I.T.
S
10
IS
15
10
8
•s
10
8
10
8
8
8
8
8
i
IT.
0
1
0
4
0
1
7
0
1
5
0
1
I
1
]
I .
0
0
0
0
1
0
4
2
I
3
6
4
2
1
1
4
1
t
0
0
2
0j
0
0
3
0
0
Q
N.
0
-1.01
0
+3.0J
0
0
+77.6
0
-J.O
0
0
450.0
0
+4.20
42.72
0
+22,7
0
+25.8
0
+55.1
+340
0
+ 1677
+2G.9
+595
+116
0
+1102
+2.SO
0
+825
n
4501)
+38.3
0
+1030
0
+890
+1.G8 .
+35.0
+315
0
+2510
+ 15.5
+TS5
+817
0
+5410
+31.4
+03.7
+510 .
4 O.SH.1,
+2370
40.3S9
+231
+132
Q
+2130
+ 23.7
+27.4
4438
0
+ 1450
0
4OT
4rfT.it
+7.8G
42350
441.3
441G
+ 1249
u
+3413
40.503
0
+ 1.30
+0.904
0
T.
S
t
10
10
15
IS
15
IS •
.15
10
9
10
6
5
S
8
2
8
8
I
10
10
G
8
8
8
5
10
10
10
6
B
8
8
8
8
8
8
6
6
8
8
6
»
8
8
2
G
7
8
t
3
a
X. I.T.
0 IS
-10.1
0
+3.02
0
0
+77.6
0
-2.0
O
0 . 7
+ W1.0
0
+426'.
45.72.
0 ., 16
+!2.7
0
+25.8
0
+55.1 3
+333
0
+1572
0
+148 7
+116
0
+1102
0
0 • 5
+825
0
+500
+0.278
0 7
+1030
0
+890
0
+35.0 4
+515
0
+2310
+0.857
. + <ii 8
+617
0
+5410
0
+17.5 3
+510 '
+O.SK.1
+2370
0
+231 •
+132
0
+2J30
+ 12.5
+22.9 S
+43S
0
+U50
0
472.2 0
.| !SA
4:.so
4 run
o
+ 114 9
+ 12J9
0
43133
0
0 B
+ 1.39
a
40.004
.0
Gaa (ntux)
J.T.
0
1
' 0
0
4 '
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
01
1
0.
'o .
1
0
0
9
0
!
S
0
1
0
0
4
a
i
i
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0i
N.
0
-1.33
0
+5,38
0
0
467.5
0
+332
+2JUS
0
-26.6
0
+19.8
0
+76.6
+117
0
+100
+1.58
+ 12.9
+38.8
0
.+ 247 '
+ 51.9
4IHI.4
+85.9
O
+012
+14.6
O
+91.0
0
+ 13G
+11.0
+1.48
+2.1.7
0
+ IAGO
+147 '
O
+ 1G5
0
+521
427.0
+ 111
+131
0
+432
+ 1.08
+143
+80.4
0
+13CO
30.0
+1C2
+133
0
+724
0
424.0
+ 1X1
+ O.G78
4 14115
'47.47
+M.S
+ 124 .
0
4 ISM)
+ 15.4
+ 30.0
+H7.3
0
424K8
+ 3.10
T.
IS
IS
1
1
7
16
16
a
a
ai
6
7
7
7
6
5
S
S
7
7
7
2
4
4
4
8
8
6
a
a
aj
B
9
9
4
4
S
4
9
0
9
2
9
7
0
9
B
B
B
0
Ciu (end)
N.
0
-1.33
0
+S.38
0
0
4C7.5
0
+•382
+25.5
0
-26.6
0
+19.8
• o
+7G.6
+117
0
+1G6
0
+12.7
+38.8 .
0
+247
+51.9
480.4
+85.9
O
+013
+14.6
0
+91.0
0
+ 130
411.0
0
+23.9
0
4IOCO
+ 147
0
+ 1G5
0.
+521
0
+111
+131
0
+432
0
+143 •
+8G.4
0
+13CO
30.0
+ 1:2
+ 1.1]
0
+754
0
H <...'• 1
41.11
4 O.r,78
4 Mil.,
II
428.2
+ 114
0
+ 12X0
+ 15.4
430.0
4B7.3
0
+ 2488
+ l.«7
Cytto a
C«* (inox)
I.T.
IS
IS
7
4
7
S
7
S
6
4
B
S
9
B
S
W.
0
1
I
S
« •
0
0
4
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
01
2
2
0
t
8
4
4
t
1
t
0
1
2
I
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
X.
0
-1.81 .
0
-18J5
0
0
-8.95
0
4100
0
-14.1
+001
0
+279
+4.00
+4.13
+216
0
+459
+0.402
+3.53
+J.93
0
+ 60.9
+0.947
+ 12.0
. +194
n
+374
+3.91
0
+S0.4
0
+75.3
+1.30
+1G.5
+7.S9
0 •
+1190
+30.1
+23.1
+31.0
0
+578
+3.8G
+15.0
+81.0
0
+357
+80.0
0
+78.8
0
+49C
+ 10.2
4G7.3
+48.2
0
+210
+ 35.5
+ 1(17
•iiol
0
+2234
4 2.V3
+33.4
+ 6.12
0
+ I55i
4C3.0
+27.J
+O.MS
+ 0.144
+ 310.0
0
T.
IS.
IS
la
• is
• 7
7
7
4
4
4
4
4
7
7
7
5
5
S
S
2
7
7
7
5
5
5
5
8
8
8
8
4
4
4
4
9
9
B
S
S
S
S
1
8
9
a
7
8
B
B
S
S
6
S
C«.(cml)
N.
0
-1.81
«
• -I8.S
0
0
-8.93
0
+160
0
-14.1
.+501
0
+278
' 0
+4.13
+210
0
+4:9
+0.462
+3.52
+29.3
0
+GO.O
+0.928
+12.0
+194
o
+374
0
0
+20.4
0
+ 75.3
+1.30
+10.5
+7.89
0
+1190
430.1
423.1
+31.0
0
+578
43.80
+ 1G.O
+81.0
n
4357
+50.0
0
+78.8
0
+43G
+ 10.2
+G7.3
+48.2
0
+:io
435.5
411.4
4 I 5 <
0
+ 2J 34
0
416.1
+ 5.46
0 .
4IM2
4C3.0
+ 27.4
+ 0.885
40.144
4310.0
0
Hw: "I.T.," li
«rbtfi g« Inert-wnl or e
•ad of cyelo. •
«lMli»ii tiiim (>l«y») fxr «>*•!•• Mwlf. i l t - l t "I..T.." ln« I into <<lity), iM.i»-<l n* linm iiitivvnf faun »lnrt of ryrln In
N." nan<mi*>1<-4. cutoulAtiv»>i "T," I'tny-), tintoi "tJa» (urnx)," i mm mum FimiuUlivi>f[iu( "tin* (>iMl)."- giu at
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of CO. 1.39 vol.%, Kr 1.37 vol.% and balance He. The total pressure was
fc
1 atm (760 ram of Hg). The initial atmosphere contained less than 25 ppm
of 0- and N . The numbers of viable organisms as determined by plate
^ * £.
counts for the various soils listed are summarized in Table 19. A
nutrient media was added at the beginning of each cycle and incubation
o • .
was at 20 +_ 2 C under dark conditions.
An inspection of the above data reveals that under these anaerobic
conditions with nutrients provided, the soil organisms produced between
-4 -710 and 10 nanomoles of CO per organism per day. Most of the soils
produced about 10 micromoles of CO per day per cc of soil.
We would like to use data like this and, in particular, data to be
obtained by Viking on Mars for estimating what the magnitude of head-
space gas exchange is likely to be in a Mars Return Sample for purposes
of designing the life support system. Unfortunately, the metabolism of
the soil microorganisms is known to be highly sensitive to nutrient
concentration. Figure 31 illustrates the effect of nutrient additions
on metabolic rate. Note that in this particular case, the availability
of a nutrient increased the metabolism by a factor of 6 to 8 over the
endogenous level.
Figures 32A and 32B from (38), illustrate the effect of adding
nutrients to a soil sample sealed in a gas-tight container. The log
ratio of CO to N or Ar is plotted as a function of time for four soil
fc £•
samples. We note that in all of the soils, the biological activity was
low enough (without nutrients added) so that the gas exchange was below
detectable limits. The head space volume was about 8 cc. The sample
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Table 19
APPBOXIMATE VIABLE ORGANISMS AT TIMES INDICATED FOB TABLE 18
EXPERIMENT
At the end of last cyclo
' before nutoclaving
At the end of autoclave
cycle
Soil Aerobic" Anaerobic" Aerobic Anaerobic
Antarctica 500
DV1S
DV 3S/1
Geyserville
Aiken
Bowers Clay #4
Hesperia
Holtville
Panoehe
Ramontv
Salinas Loam
Siskiyou
Staten Island P.M.
Tulc Lake
Waukena
Yolo
0
3x 102
3x106
0
3x10^
3 x 10*
3x l0 9
• 3 x 103
3x 108
3x 108
3 x 10s
3 x 106
3 x 107
3 x 105
3 x 10;
3 x 105 •
0
3 x 102
3 x 1010
0
3x 108
3x 106
3 x 109
3x 104
3x 10»
3 x 1010
3 x 1010
3 x 10'
3 x 109
3x 108
3 x 107
3x 107
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3 x 103
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3 x 101
0
3x 10l
3x 102
3 x 102
0
• o
" Growth occurring in last serial 10-fold dilution of TSB (aerobic) and
thioglycollate medium (anaerobic).
Reproduced from (4)
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Figure 31. Oxygen Uptake of
Achromobacter fisheri with
and without glucose
Reproduced from (36)
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FIG.,A Cos disequilibrium in samples of Tucson.
Ariz, sat! mixtures during incubation in A'," atmos-
phere at room temperature after addition of (a) /.<o-
mers of a mixture of seven nmino acids and (b) iso-
mers of a mixture of jive carbohydrates. Symbols:-
B, D isomers; ©. L isomcrs; A. addition of icn.'cr
only. Vertical lines represent the .°9("r confidence
limits of each mean ratio of experiments u'ith dupli-
cate samples. Vertical axis shows the log ratios of
ion intensities.
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FIG. .fe Gas disequilibrium in (a) clay loam soil
(Siluer Bell, Arizona: 91 to 97 cm depth) and (b)
Antartic dry valley soil (no. 500) during incubation in
Ar atmosphere at room temperature after addition of
isomcrs of a mixture of five carbohydrates. Symbols:
B, D isomcrs: 0, L isomcrs; A, water controls. Ver-
tical lines represent the .'W% confidence limits of each
mean ratio of experiments it'ith triplicate samples
u'ith the carbohydrates and duplicate samples with
the control. Vertical axis shows the log ratios of ion
intensities.
Figure 32
Reproduced from (38)
Final Report 1975
Contract No. NASW-2280
page 4.95
BIOSPHERICS INCORPORATED
weighed 1 gram, and 1 ml of 50 yM nutrient solution comprised of five
carbohydrates and seven araino acids in equimolar proportions was used.
These data support the theory that the activity of soil biota is limited
by the availability of nutritional sources. If we assume that the
nutrient to be added is not toxic to Martian biota, we can at least
obtain an upper limit for the gas exchange rates under dark conditions
from the Viking experiments.
The dark conditions information is only half the story. We also
need to know what happens under light conditions in order to decide what
the net exchange rates will be between the soil sample and the headspace
gas. The Viking pyrolytic analysis experiment data can give a partial
answer to this question. In the pyrolytic experiment, a soil sample
will be incubated under simulated radiation conditions in a labeled
14
..CO atmosphere. After the incubation period, the fixed organic
material is pyrolysed and the labeled CO given off is detected. Thus,
an estimate of the photosynthetic activity in the sample is derived.
Unfortunately, for our purposes, the short wavelength ultraviolet is not
simulated for the experiment since this radiation causes CO and HO to
combine in an abiogenic synthesis of organic matter C4). While this
process is undesirable from a life detection standpoint and is con-
sequently avoided, if it occurs it might be an important life process.
Finally, light reactions or biological activity involving gases other
than those containing carbon will not be monitored by any of the Viking
experiments. Table 20 (4} gives some typical results for soils using
the Viking pyrolytic analysis experiment.
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In summary, we find the following probable situation at the time
when a planetary return mission is attempted:
(1) Atmospheric gas exchange is likely to be important to
the life support function.
(2) We will have very incomplete information relative to
the rates of gas exchange and atmospheric con-
stituents involved.
In the absence of post-Viking missions comprised of experiments designed
to provide better data relative to the gas exchange rates, the design of
the life support system becomes one of solving a problem with a large
number of unknowns.
In solving problems where large numbers of unknowns exist, the
designer is usually forced into using a "brute force" technique. Two
such possibilities exist for coping with the gas exchange problem. The
first type of solution involves providing a large enough headspace
volume so that the maximum, gas exchange rates expected do not signifi-
cantly change the composition of the headspace atmosphere during the
return trip. We have given this concept the nomenclature, "Infinite
Reservoir". The second approach involves analyzing the headspace gas on
a periodic basis and adjusting its composition through a combination of
scrubbers and makeup gas supplies.
4.4.2.4.1 Infinite Reservoir Concept for Gas Exchange
The most obvious approach to the "Infinite Reservoir" concept is
simply to make the headspace volume physically large. Unfortunately, in
an application where space and weight are at a premium, the
disadvantages of this approach are equally obvious. We could
increase the pressure of the headspace gas and achieve an effectively
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Table 20
COj ASSIMILATION IN SOILS'*
Amount
of soil
Soil (mg) Algae
Algal (sterilized)
Algal
Algal
Fann (sterilized)
Farm
Farm
A609 (sterilized)
A609
A609
AG52 (sterilized)
A652
Siskiyou clay (sterilized)
Siskiyou clay
Siskiyou clay
Siskiyou clay
Barren topsoil (sterilized)
Barren topsoil
Barren topsoil
Barren topsoil
15
14
12
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15 '
15
15
-105
~105
30
30
0
0
0
0
-100
-100
-100
Bacteria
4.9 x 10*
4.2 x 103 .
5.3 x 105
5.3 x 10s
300
300
150
Cx 10"
6x 104
C x 104
1.2 x 10°
1.2 x 106
1.2 x 10«
Exposure Pyrolysis Trapped
conditions COz organics
(hr) (counts/minjabove back-
ground
Dark, 23
Dark, 23
Light, 23
Dark, 3
Dark, 3
Dark, 24
Light, 22
Light, 22
Dark, 22
Light, 22
Light, 22
Light, 24
Light, 3
Light, 24
Light, 96
Light, 24
Light, 3
Light, 24
Light, 96
319
7,104
106,588
9,339
13,799
8.C89
8,354
7,023
16,832
20,413
11,825
112
361
1,070
2,862
142,635
171,829
107,765
192,767
10
1,434
107,399
10
110
449
3
165
78
19
13
1
68
272
544
50
1,072
4,902
2S;3S5
0
 Approximately 300ing samples of soils \vere spread ou sterile stainless steel planchets and
moistened with 0.3ml of sterile distilled \vntor and placed inside a Pyrex chamber having a capacity
of approximately 40ml. The chamber had a pressure of l a t in of air enriched with 0.04% excess
14CO2 (final specific activity of CO; = 15Ci/inoIe). For light exposure, the chambers were placed under
fluorescent lights at approximately OOOft-c light intensity. For dark-exposed samples, the chambers
were wrapped with opaque cloth before the, introduction of UCO:>. After exposure, the samples
were dried at lio°C and aliijuots were taken for analysis. Sterile controls were prepared by dry-heat
sterilization of soils overnight at 17o°C and exposure as described above. Microbial counts refer to
the quality of soil taken for pyrolysis (12-15mg). . .
Reproduced from (4)
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larger volume in this way. However, the higher partial pressures of
some of the constituent gases might be toxic to life forms or cause
a shift in the balance of on-going chemical and biochemical reactions.
A third possibility makes use of the sorption phenomena discussed
earlier.
A number of finely divided materials have found use as sorbents.
The most important of these materials are "active" charcoal, silica
gel and the zeolites. Their use in the manufacture of gas masks
and passive vacuum pumps has resulted in a large volume of experi-
mental data on the sorption process although technologists have
been unable to develop a fully satisfactory theory of the complex
physical and chemical processes involved in sorption. Dushman CIS)
considers the phenomena in detail and provides an excellent summary of
the theory and experimental results.
In general, it is found that the quantity of the sorbate gas is a
function of the pressure and temperature as well as the physical state
of the sorbent. Figures 33A and 33B from (.18) illustrate sorption
isotherms for carbon dioxide on wood charcoal. The quantity, Vo, is the
volume of gas in cubic centimeters under STP (P°C, 760 mm) conditions.
From Figure 33A,
 We see that at O°C a change in Vo of 1 cc STP would
cause only 1 mm change in pressure. As a comparison, the evolution of 1
cc, STP of CO by the sample into the same headspace unit volume would
raise the pressure in the headspace to at least 760 mm, depending on
the starting pressure. Thus, the inclusion of the sorbent has the
effect of greatly buffering the headspace against changes in gas composition.
50
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The concept underlying the possible use of a sorbent material such
as activated charcoal or a zeolite as a buffer involves exposing a fully
degassed sorbent to the planetary atmosphere at the time the sample is
collected. The sorbent comes to equilibrium with the atmosphere and is
then sealed with the sample. Subsequent gas exchange between the sample
and headspace is then buffered by sorbent equilibrium with the headspace
gases so that a much higher gas exchange disequilibrium between the
sample and headspace can be tolerated without significantly changing the
balance of the headspace constituent gases.
It must be noted that the sorption equilibrium is temperature-
dependent so that changes in the temperature of the sorbent during the
return voyage would be reflected as significant variations in the head-
space gas pressure. Temperature cycles on the order of those expected
for the Martian diurnal cycle (> 100°C) would result in very large
headspace pressure changes and weigh heavily against the use of this
technique if the diurnal cycle is to be simulated. It must also be
noted that the soil in the sample itself will act as a sorbent for gases
and thereby introduce headspace pressure fluctuations with temperature.
The magnitude of these fluctuations would undoubtedly be considerably
smaller than those for activated charcoal or a zeolite, but they would
none-the-'less, be significant over the temperature range of a Martian
diurnal cycle.
Coupling of the headspace gas pressure with the sample temperature
can be circumvented by maintaining the "Infinite Reservoir" at the
collection temperature as the sample is cycled. This would buffer the
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gas constituents and the headspace pressure over the diurnal cycle.
And, in fact, by controlling the temperature of the sorbent as a function
of headspace pressure, a means of total pressure compensation would be
available. However, heat conduction between the sample and reservoir
would require considerable extra power consumption for operating the
thermal control system.
Furthermore, if the estimates of the Martian atmosphere are even
nominally accurate, the very low atmospheric concentrations of CO in the
case of a CO-CO cycle or even lower free oxygen concentration for an
°2"~CO2 cvcle woul<a support only a very small disequilibrium in gas
exchange rate over the duration of the return voyage. Inclusion of a
sorbent would however, greatly reduce the chance of a toxic gas buildup.
On the basis of the present level of information, the merits of inclusion
of a simple integral sorbent probably do not balance the disadvantages.
If it is determined by Viking or other means that a significant potential
for toxic gas buildup exists, then the "Infinite Reservoir" concept
would deserve serious consideration.
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4.4.2.4.2 Headspace Atmosphere Analysis and Adjustment
The analysis and adjustment scheme for headspace gas constituent
control can be made to overcome the basic difficulty of the passive
"Infinite Reservoir" concept, that of very low atmospheric concentrations
of one of the biologically active gases. A price must be paid, however,
in added complexity and an increased thermal load on the sample cooling
system.
The simplest mechanization of an active scheme in terms of hardware
might comprise an "Infinite Reservoir" and another reservoir of the
gases which are normally at low concentrations in the planetary atmosphere.
The "Infinite Reservoir" would provide buffering and scrubbing action.
As the low concentration metabolite gases were consumed they could be
replenished from the second reservoir where they would be stored in high
concentrations. Either a cyclic operation of the "Infinite Reservoir"
or introduction of the makeup'gases through the soil from the "bottom"
of the sample could be used to minimize direct sorption of the metabolite
gases by the "Infinite Reservoir," the soil in the sample acting as a
buffer reservoir. Figure 34 illustrates the concept schematically.
Two techniques which could potentially be used to monitor the
headspace gas composition are: gas chromatography and mass spectrometry.
Each has advantages and undesirable features in the contemplated
application. Both instruments have been developed for use in the Viking
program and are therefore readily adaptable to the purpose at hand. The
gas chromatograph has the advantage of good separation of CO and
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whereas in the mass spectrometer, C02 can break down into CO+ and 0 upon
ionization. In this case, the atmospheric CO is indistinguishable from
the C02 degradation product (39). In addition, N2 (mass 28.006) and CO
(mass 27.895) are confused in a mass spectrometer of resolution suitable
for spaceflight. The N, and CO confusion is not likely to be a serious
problem in the present application, but the CX>2 degradation to CO+ is
unacceptable if it is established that CO plays an important biological
role. This latter problem might be allieviated by the use of a selective
filter to remove the C02, but since the relative concentration of CO2 is
believed to be approximately 1,000 times that of CO, the design and
development of such a filter would be both difficult and complicated.
The mass spectrometer has one major practical advantage over the gas
chromatograpic approach; it does hot require a carrier gas. It does,
however, require a good vacuum which in the case of the Viking instrument
is provided by an ion pump.
Gas chromatography can provide good separation and identification
of all the potentially biologically important metabolite gases. The
Viking gas chromatographic unit (37) employs a Poropak Q column which
cannot, however, adequately separate Argon, CO and 02- If Argon is
present on Mars in substantially higher concentrations than CO and 02, a
new column would be required. Heylmun (40) has reported separation of
oxygen and Argon in a 99 percent Argon atmosphere using a molecular
sieve column at 72°C. The major problems in employing a gas chromatograph
for headpsace analysis arise because of the required carrier gas.
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Although the sampled gas volume is very small (^ 0.1 cc), a relatively
large volume of carrier gas is required for the measurement (M.O cc/min).
Thus, a large supply of carrier gas would be required and some way to
collect and dispose of the carrier gas after it passes through the
detectors must also be devised.
The carrier gas supply problem is simply one of weight and size
since the components have been developed for Viking. The problem of
disposing of the used gas under the quarantine regime to be imposed on a
return sample is much more difficult. Three approaches to this problem
were considered:
(1) Collect and store the spent carrier gas in another
container.
(2) Collect, purify and pump the carrier gas back into
the supply bottle.
(3) Collect and allow the carrier gas to escape over-
board through biologically :secure filters.
The first approach, illustrated in Figure 35, results in even more
/
size and weight since another storage container must be provided and,
unless a pump is included to compress the gas into this container, it
must be even larger than the supply bottle. When this situation is
evaluated against the component sizes for Viking (a much shorter duration
mission), it becomes clear that this approach has very undesirable weight
and size characteristics.
In the second approach, a relatively small volume of carrier gas
would be required, only enough to perform one measurement plus a reserve
for leakage, pump inefficiency and adsorption by the sample and purifying
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filter. Furthermore, the gas storage pressure could be.relatively low
and the space requirements would not be excessive. A pump development
would be required. If the configuration illustrated in Figure 36 is used,
the pump seals would not be particularly critical.
The third approach considered is illustrated in Figure 37. The
carrier gas is accumulated in the temporary storage bottle and allowed
to diffuse through the thin metal or glass membranes. (Depending on the
specific carrier gas used). The membranes act as a biological barrier
and the system is provided with backup filters as a failsafe precaution.
The weight and size would be intermediate to the first two approaches.
The approach has the obvious disadvantage of a potential quarantine
breach.
On the basis of our preliminary evaluation, the second approach has
the merits of minimum size and weight and the added advantage of total
containment within the quarantine container. The pump is believed to be
well within the state-of-the-art. Unless the pump development proves to
be considerably more difficult than we imagine, the second approach is
the method of choice. It appears to have very significant weight and
size advantages over either of the other two considered.
V. '
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4.4.2.5 Strategy D - Hypothermia Plus Infinite Reservoir
This strategy represents an extension of STRATEGY B to include a
reservoir of atmosphere as a precaution against changes in the headspace
gas composition due to metabolic activity or chemical instability in the
sample. The goals of the strategy are:
(1) To prevent contamination of the sample
(2) To preserve the contents of the sample
(3) To preserve the chemical, biological and
physical status of the sample by retard-
ing the on-going processes through the
imposition of a low temperature regimen.
(4) To provide a buffered headspace atmos-
phere as a precaution against toxic
accumulation of gaseous metabolic pro-
ducts and/or chemical decay products.
The strategy must be recognized to have the following explicit limitations;
(1) Although the probability would be significantly
reduced under the low temperature regimen and
buffered atmosphere, life forms may auto-
sterilize and species populations may be
altered because of exhaustion of substrates
and nutrients or the absence of a critical
environmental factor such as radiation in-
put, or temperature cycling.
(2) The organic chemistry of the sample may be
altered due to an altered biological com-
ponent or environmental factor such as
radiation input or ion exchange.
(3) No provisions for monitoring or biohazard
assessment measurements are included.
(4) The inclusion of an absorbent in the
sample container results in increased
probability of contaminating the sample
both biologically and chemically.
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A practical implementation of the concept can be based on the con-
figuration shown in Figure 26. In this case, however, an absorbent, com-
prised of a zeolite, for example, would be included in the cap. The
absorbent would be enclosed in a sealed compartment except for micro-
pore filtered ports to allow gas exchange in a manner to preclude
exchange of particulate matter. The micropore filters might consist of
a stack of thin gold plates pierced by submicron holes. Laser drilling
could be used to generate the small holes required.
4.4.2.6 Strategy E - Simulated Diurnal Cycle Plus Active Gas Exchange
This strategy represents an extension of STRATEGY C to include:
o A reservoir of atmosphere as a precaution
against accumulation of gaseous metabolic
or chemical decay products in the headspace
of the sample container.
o A supply of biologically consumed gases which
are. normally present in low concentrations in
the planetary atmosphere.
o Means for sensing and regulating the con-
centration of the headspace component gases.
The goals of the strategy are:
(1) To prevent contamination of the sample
(2) To preserve the sample constituents
(3) To maintain any biological activity by simu-
lating the thermal pattern and radiation
flux of the natural habitat.
(4) To provide a buffered headspace atmos-
phere as a precaution against toxic
accumulation of gaseous metabolic or
chemical decay products.
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(5) To provide a supply of metabolite gases as
a precaution against disequilibrium of eco-
system/atmospheric balance caused by inadequate
simulation of the sample boundary con-
ditions or the collection of an incom-
plete ecosystem.
Figure 38 illustrates the concept schematically. The sample con-
tainer could, be made similar to that shown in Figure 26, except that
connections for the gas reservoirs, gas chromatograph and headspace
pressure tranducer would be required. The gas reservoir could con-
sist of containers filled with a zeolite and separated from the
sample by a filter which would allow gas diffusion, but block
particulate matter transfer. The gas chromatograph could be based
on the configuration illustrated in Figure 34.
The strategy has the following explicit limitations:
(1) Increased container complexity and materials
thermal coefficient matching problems intro-
duce greater uncertainty in our ability to pre-
vent contamination or escape of the sample through
gaseous diffusion and small leaks. These leak
possibilities are not believed to be significant
from a quarantine standpoint since the sample
cannister and associated equipment will be en-
. closed in an isolation capsule which will provide
the quarantine barrier in any case.
(2) A significant possibility exists that the sample
would be contaminated biologically or chemically
by the zeolite material or entrained micro-
organisms in the gas reservoirs and gas chroma-
tograph column.
(3) If the photosynthetic component of the life cycle
occurs in the bulk of the atmosphere, the
radiation input provided would not adequately
simulate in situ conditions since an equivalent
atmosphere depth cannot be provided. The
metabolite gas reservoir can be sized to accommo-
date a nominal disequilibrium in the metabolite
gas cycles, however, if the metabolic rate is
higher than expected, changes in the headspace
gas composition which could adversely affect
the biological component might occur.
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'(4) The organic chemistry of the sample may be
altered by a changing biological component
or lack of a critical environmental factor
such as ion or water exchange with the atmos-
phere and underlying soil.
(5) Biological activity may be modified by lack
of a critical factor related to interactions
with the underlying soil.
The inclusion of monitoring capability of the headspace gases results
in the availability of a tool for use in assessing biological activity
and quarantine implications.
4.4.2.7 Water, Nutrient, or Inorganic Matter Additions and/or Regulations
In addition to gas exchange, it is conceivable that exchange of
water, nutrients and inorganic ions may be important to life processes
in the sample. This would certainly be true in the case of an Earth
sample. Unfortunately, we are very unlikely to have sufficient data on
the metabolisms and life processes of Martian biota to be able to define
a suitable program for supplementing or regulation of these exchangeable
materials at the time of a return sample. And, with this requisite
information lacking, it seems prudent to implement no supplemental program
rather than risk the results of a poorly understood attempt.
The contamination of the sample from a chemical standpoint and
the potential biological disequilibrium which might result.from pro-
viding substrates, nutrients and even water, provide more potent
arguments against supplemental programs than the uncertain benefits.
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4.4.3 Life Support Monitoring
Some of the questions sure to arise in connection with a planetary
return mission are: How do we know that the biota in the sample did not
"die" or change population distribution during the long return voyage?
How do we know the life support system worked? Even assuming that the
biologists could reconstruct much of the information from a "dead" sample,
a set of measurements characterizing the sample during the life and death
phases would be an invaluable aid to this reconstruction process and
advancement of the life support technoloav. For example, a history of
the headspace qas component concentrations could provide a basis for
estimating the metabolism rates, the order of death of various species,
the representativeness of the biota left alive at the end of the voyage,
the kinds of nutrients and substrates which limited life, and further
life support requirements for subsequent missions.
I
If one carries this line of reasoning to its lo'gical conclusion,
a large number of physical parameters of the sample such as temperature,
pH, Eh, relative humidity, headspace pressure and even specific ion
concentrations could provide valuable information. Highly desirable
measurements of biological activity such as might be provided by labeled
carbon nutrient additions (5) would also be important. Unfortunately,
the experiment would quickly get out of hand. The complexity of
equipment which can perform remotely and in a quarantine compatible
environment even the simplest measurements was demonstrated
by Viking development experience to be formidable. A fully instru-
mented planetary return sample experiment with its life support
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functions and monitoring could easily evolve into a development program
which would be an order of magnitude more difficult than the Viking
biological package.
The problem of instrumenting the return sample capsule becomes one
of carefully balancing the desire for a record of what happened inside
the sample during the return voyage against mission cost and develop-
ment and operational complexity. These tradeoffs are difficult to make
given the present level of uncertainty in the mission, planetary con-
ditions, biological activity, etc. However, it is our opinion that the
order of priority for records would be as follows:
1. Temperature
2. Headspace gas including water vapor, CO, CO2
CH4, H2S, O2, SOX, NOX, N2, NH3, formaldehyde,
and ethylene.
3. Visual image of sample surface interface with
headspace atmosphere
4. Response to selected nutrient additions
5. Other physical parameters
In addition to the constraints imposed by development complexity
and cost considerations, the desire to maintain the sample in a pris-
tine state is in conflict with the desire for historical records dur-
ing the return voyage. The sample temperature can be readily measured
within the constraints of sample quarantine and preservation criteria.
Monitoring other parameters listed above would compromise to some ex-
tent the sample integrity. The headspace gas composition and visual
observation can be accomplished if the gaseous contamination criteria
are relaxed on this portion of the sample. Nutrient addition and
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monitoring specific ion concentrations would also compromise the chemical
and biological integrity of the sample.
The strategy to be adopted for a planetary return mission will be a
function of the biohazard assessment approach taken for the mission.
For example,.if an extensive biohazard assessment program is followed,
it is likely that much of the desired historical data to be derived from
nutrient additions would be available from the biohazard assessment
tests on a separate portion of the sample. In this case, emphasis
should be on preserving the sample integrity and only those measure-
ments which involve very low risk of contaminating the main sample
should be undertaken.
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4.5 Biohazard Assessment and Control Subsystem
In Section 3.3, we found that the incorporation of a compre-
hensive biohazard assessment and control subsystem (BAG) as an integral
part of the return mission should be given high priority. The biohazard
assessment and control function differs in a fundamental way from that
of exobiology detection. In the latter case, we are primarily concerned
with determining if life forms exist. And, it is generally agreed that
the most probable environment for detecting exobiota is in its native
environment or a close simulation of its native conditions. The BAG
function, is on the other hand, interested in what would happen in terres-
trial conditions. Would the exobiota grow? Would it be subject to in-
hibition by naturally occurring factors? Could inhibition be induced
by practical "countermeasures" should a quarantine breach occur? What
would be the effect on the terrestrial biosphere from exposure to the
exobiota?
In the following material we discuss the implementation of what we
believe to be a suitable approach to the BAG function for planetary
return missions in the 1980's. We have defined, in preliminary form,
an implementation scheme based on updated Viking technology, which
we believe would meet minimum requirements within the cost and develop-
ment constraints of a Mars Return Sample Mission.
4.5.1. Sterilization
A primary requirement for any BAG system is sterilization capability.
At the present state of definition of a planetary return mission two
basic situations are under consideration: (1) a priori sterilization
of the return sample before committing to the return and, (2) contingency
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sterilization of the sample during the mission at any time the mission
is determined to become nonnominal. The general sterilization problem has
received extensive treatment and coverage (10, 26, 41, 42) in connection
with the on-going quarantine program. Two basic methods have demon-
strated adequate performance on terrestrial organisms, heat and ionizing
radiation.
The general consensus of the quarantine community is that these
techniques can provide adequate protection against exobiota if small
contingency factors are added to standard practice. Since exobiology is
assumed to be based on carbon chemistry, it should be subject to the
same chemical laws relative to bond strengths as terrestrial life.
Sterilization of a planetary.return sample has an additional consideration
over ordinary sterilization practice: the desire to minimize chemical
and structural damage to the sample.
In general, radiation sterilization procedures are thought to
minimize damage to the sample and are, therefore, preferable to either
dry or wet heat sterilization for return samples. However, exposure of
the sample to radioactivity does cause some changes in the sample which
are undesirable. It is difficult, within quarantine constraints, to
design a spaceflight manageable, failsafe radiation sterilization
scheme without significant radiation exposure of the sample even if the
actual sterilization procedure is not used. The choice of a sterilization
method for a return sample is not as obvious as the above considerations
might indicate.
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After weighing the relative advantages of heat and radiation
sterilization against the mission constraints and, in particular, the
design constraints for the quarantine barrier, we conclude that:
(1) If the decision to sterilize the sample is
firm and made a priori, then radiation
sterilization is marginally the best
method.
(2) If a contingency sterilization strategy
is adopted for the'mission, then heat
sterilization is preferred since, in the
case where sterilization is not re-
quired (assumed to be the nominal
mode), no exposure to adverse con-
ditions is required.
4.5.2 Growth and Inhibition in Terrestrial Environment
The problem of characterizing the growth and inhibition of exobiota
in terrestrial environments is complicated by a combination of three
distinct difficulties:
1. The terrestrial environment cannot be characterized
by a single set of parametric values such as tem-
perature; water activity; oxygen, carbon dioxide
and other gaseous constituent concentrations in
the atmosphere; and nutrient availability. In-
stead, many widely different microenvironments
exist.
2. It is likely that chemical reactions will
be induced by the introduction of the planetary
sample into a terrestrial environment. Depend-
ing on the detection methods used and the actual
magnitude of these reactions, biological activity
may be masked or "swamped out" by these chemical
phenomena.
3. The reliability of the measurement techniques
for exotic life forms and even for a sig-
nificant number of terrestrial microorganisms
is open to question.
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In the face of these complicating factors, we have adopted a more or
less serial approach beginning with conditions near those on Mars and
changing toward terrestrial conditions of higher water activity and
temperature. Even under this serial approach, four separate experimental
chambers and samples will be required.
The sample experiments involve testing the planetary material under
aerobic conditions in one chamber, in anaerobic conditions in another,
and performing controls in the other two chambers using sterilized
planetary material. The water activity would be low initially with the
temperature near Mars median day temperature. A radiation source simulating
sunlight at the Earth would be cycled on and off to test for phototrophic
as well as heterotrophic activity. The water activity and temperature
would be slowly increased to typical Earth tropical conditions. Water
would then be added to form an aquatic environment. Thermal cycles
could be incorporated at various points to test for temperature effects
with the other parameters fixed. The measurement instrumentation
could be based on updated Viking technology and is discussed in Section
4.5.4. Specific inhibition techniques other than nutrient limitation,
water activity and temperature could be tested at the end of the experi-
ment against the marine environment recognizing that the first success-
ful test would terminate the experiment. Reference (5) gives a detailed
discussion of multiple nutrient and inhibitor test sequences and rationale.
The test sequence should be carried out on the planet surface prior to
launching the return sample.
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4.5.3 Interaction with Earth Ecosystems
The growth and inhibition experiments can provide important
information on the environmental tolerance and nutrient requirements of
exobiota. This data can, in turn, be used to predict the impact on the '
terrestrial biosphere of a quarantine breach. It must be noted, however,
that this is.not a direct measurement. It does not measure directly the
ability of the exobiota to compete with native organisms in a terrestrial
environment. In addition, there is a risk that the measurement methods
may underestimate the level of activity or miss it entirely. After the
sample has left the surface of the planet, but before it leaves planetary
orbit, we have an opportunity to make more direct measurements, that is,
expose a number of typical terrestrial ecosystems to the exobiota. In
this case, we can monitor the activity of the terrestrial organisms
selected to be representative of the most important life processes on
Earth and for ease in establishing and monitoring species metabolism and
ecosystem stability.
Fortunately, most of the basic life processes and nutrient cycles
can be investigated through microecosystems based on a few species of
microorganisms. Interactions of microorganisms at the base of the food
chain can be studied at the metabolic level and, through the use of a
camera, at the microscopic level. At the metabolic level processes
which can be monitored include heterotrophic metabolism (fermentation,
glycolysis, etc.), autotrophic metabolism (photosynthesis and chemosynthesis)
and nitrogen and sulfur metabolism. In the following section, we outline
a BAG mechanization based on updated Viking technology which attempts to
provide reasonable protection within practical constraints for a 1980's
Mars Return Sample Mission.
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4.5.4 BAG Implementation Scheme Based on Updated Viking Technology
The BAG subsystem is comprised of two separate modules with the
same basic design. One of the modules is intended for the growth and
inhibition experiments on the planetary surface. The other module is to
be used for the microecosystem insult tests in planetary orbit. Figure 39
illustrates the concept schematically. Each module is comprised of four
experiment chambers, a thermal control subsystem, a lamp for simulating
sunlight, a sample distribution subsystem and a battery of analytical
instruments. The analytical instruments are based on those developed
for the Viking program (Figures 40-43) and include a pyrolytic release
or carbon assimilation unit (10), a multiple labeled release unit (10),
a gas chromatograph unit (10), a light-scattering detector (10) and a
camera. The module is designed so that each chamber can be rotated into
the analysis station a number of times during the course of the experiment.
1
An "Infinite Reservoir" scrubber system and a reservoir of metabolite
gases similar to those described in Section 4.4.2.4 are included and can
be valved to any of the four experiment chambers.
A summary of the BAG surface module function is given below:
Chamber Use; 1. Aerobic environments
2. Aerobic control
3. Anaerobic environments
4. Anaerobic control
Experiments: Growth-inhibition studied under programmed
variation of environmental conditions
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Carbon assimilation (Experiment I). The soil sample is placed in one of three movable
incubation cells under an atmosphere containing labeled carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide
(addition of water vapor is optional upon command). The samples are incubated for several clays
under light from a xenon lamp, filtered to remove energy below 310mm. At the end of tlie incubation,
the headspace gases are flushed from the chamber and an acceptable background is counted by the
detectors. The sample is then pyrolyzed to GOO:C, and the evolved gases are swept onto the copper
oxide trapping column held at 120:C. The carbon dioxide liberated in the pyrolysis passes through.
the column to both the detector and holding chamber for counting. The system is then purged,
background counted, and the trapped organics are liberated from the column by heating the column
to 700"C. During this process, the organics are oxidized and transferred to the detector chamber for
counting.
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Label release (Experiment II). The soil sample is placed in one of two movable incubation
chambers. The stored nutrient and t ho incubation chamber are both flushed, after which, the nutrient
is inject oil Onto tho soil. The evolution of labeled gas is monitored in the detector chamber.
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Gas exchange (Experiment III). The soil is placed in one of two movable incubation cham-
bers. After purging of the system, the nutrient is added in a manner that does not submerge tho
entire soil sample. Krypton is added as an internal standard. Exchange of gas into the hoadspace is
sampled by the gas sampling valve which removes a 100/ul sample and places it in the helium carrier
stream. The gaseous components of the sample aro resolved on the chromatograph column and, upon
reaching the detector, yield a signal that when compared with the pure helium reference side is
proportional to the gas concentration. The retention time of the various gaseous components is used
to identify the various gases.
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Light scattering (Experiment IV). The soil is placed in one of two incubation chambers
into a porous frit cup. Water is then added to the chamber so ns n'ot to totally submerge the sample
and is periodically monitored thereafter for changes in light scattering and light transmission through
the optical cuvette portion of the chamber. The reference beam is also measured. The entire optical
assembly can swing away to allow rotation of the incubation cells into position.
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The BAG flight module will perform the following experiments:
Chamber Use; 1."^
2.> Earth microecosystem insult studies
3
-J
4. Mars environment simulation for historical
record during return trip
Experiments; Insult monitoring using terrestrial micro-
ecosystems as sensor and long-term monitoring
of return sample in simulated native environ-
ment.
4.6 Sample Transfer in Earth Orbit
Sample transfer from the return spacecraft to the shuttle in Earth
orbit can be accomplished using the concepts developed for sample transfer
in Mars orbit and described in Section 4.2. As a precaution against
residual contamination of the exterior surfaces of the return spacecraft,
a flexible bioshield could be deployed enclosing the return spacecraft
prior to docking with the shuttle or a sample recovery module. Connection
between the return sample quarantine container and reentry container can
be made via a flexible tube similar to the concept illustrated in Figure
6. The sample quarantine container would be transferred to the reentry
container and the connecting tube sealed in steps as illustrated in the
concept shown in Figure 7. The reentry container would then be recovered
by the shuttle for in orbit experimentation and subsequent return to
Earth.
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5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In reviewing the technological requirements for a Planetary
Return Sample Mission (PRSM), we found many specific engineering
details which need to be addressed. Most are within the current
state-of-the-art. However, technology transfer from the physical
sciences and engineering to biological applications is involved
in many instances. Because of the technology transfer aspects
and unusual conditions such as preflight sterilization involved,
development and testing lead times for planetary missions will be
relatively long and expensive in comparison to non-biological
space missions.
We found that for three technical problem areas the state-
of-the-art must be advanced significantly to support a PRSM. These
areas are:
1. Life support for the exobiota during the return trip and
within the Planetary Receiving Laboratory (PRL).
2. Biohazard assessment and control technology.
3. Quarantine qualified handling and experimentation methods
and equipment for studying the returned sample in the
PRL.
We conclude that additional studies are urgently required in
the later two areas since the viability of the PRSM concept is
inextricably dependent upon achieving practicable and convincing
solutions to these problems. We have included a suggested statement
of work for these two studies in the following material. In addition,
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we conclude that high priority be given to establish more accurately
the life support information needed to define adequately a strategy
and design parameters for this important function. We believe that
the back-up Viking spacecraft with relatively minor modifications
to the experiments could gather this information.
5.1 Suggested Work Statement for a Basic Warning System and a
Preliminary Definition Study of the PRL
A. Purpose
The objective of this effort is to devise a program to
define and establish the feasibility of a biohazard basic warning
system using microecosystems incorporating the basic idea that by
monitoring the interaction of extraterrestrial materials with a
few selected microorganisms a first approximation to the biohazard
represented by quarantine breakdown could be established.
B. Tasks
1. Conduct a Study to Select One or Two Candidate Basic
Warning System Microecosystems for an Ultimate System
Which Would Satisfy the Following:
a. Be representative of the most important life
processes
b. Be compatible with spaceflight and quarantine
requirements
c. Be compatible with existing technology for
monitoring perturbances on the ecosystem
d. Conduct a literature review on research being
done on Desert Biomes and Alpine Tundra
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e. Interview leading scientific authorities on this
research to establish candidate ecosystems for
detailed investigation and analysis
2. Define a Basic Warning System Based on the Set of
Microecosysterns and Existing or Near-Term Technology
for Evaluating the Effect of the Sample on the Micro-
ecosystems Developed Under (1).
a. Review life detection and monitoring techniques
for sensitivity
b. Develop other methods beyond Viking Technology
for assaying unknown life forms to include detection
of perturbations to known organisms
c. Develop techniques to differentiate between biological
and other types of insults
3. Design Strategy and Methodology for Employing Basic
Warning System in Quarantine Protocol for Planetary
Return Technology
a. Assess life support requirements of the ecosystems
in relation to practical problems involved in
employing the basic warning system
b. Formulate qualitative assessment of biohazard
implications of positive and negative responses
4. Design, Construct and Test a Feasibility Model Basic
Warning System
a. Construct and demonstrate laboratory breadboard
system which will simulate storage and activation
of component ecosystems utilizing selected assess-
ment techniques
5. ' Justify Model Basic Warning System as a Suitable
Approach to Minimizing Risks Associated with Inter-
planetary Biological Interaction
6. Conduct a Preliminary Definition Study of Planetary
Receiving Laboratory to Provide NASA with Pertinent
Information Before Extensive Programs are Planned
and/or Conducted
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This study will collect and refine data on kinds of experiments
which need to be performed, their scientific justification, avail-
ability of suitable techniques and equipment. This will include:
a. Survey of scientific communities and NASA centers
b. Compile survey data into a report to be circulated
to participants for criticism
c. Examine experiments in terms of compatibility with
quarantine restrictions, available instrumentation
with quarantine systems and desired sensitivities
d. If new instrumentation is required, present a plan
as to feasibility, time schedule and cost
e. Summarize in report form a.test program, available
instrumentation, specifications for new instrumenta-
tion if necessary
f. Conduct symposia to resolve criticisms from partici-
pants and/or scientific community
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Respectfully submitted,
J. Micnael Hall,
Systems Engineer
Approved by:
Gilbert V. Levin, Ph. D. ,
Principal Investigator
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APPENDIX A
TRANSLATION OF THE HYDROGEN LOSS CRITERIA INTO A '
SPECIFICATION FOR HYDROGEN LEAK RATE
In their sample preservation study, Jaffe et al (1) determined
that: "The hydrogen loss, at partial pressures of 10"1 to 10" torr of
free H , should not exceed 5% in two years." If we define the total
quantity of H in the container as Q and the leak rate, q, measured in
the same units as Q per second, we have:
6 0.05 6ql
7Where t = 2 years = 6.3 x 10 seconds
A is the surface area of the container.
From Dushman (7) we find for metals:
d
Q = PV ' eq 3
Where k is the diffusion constant
o
. . . d is the wall thickness in mm
p is the partial pressure
b is a constant
T is the absolute temperature
V is the container volume
Therefore the ratio of the leak rate due to diffusion to the total quantity
of gas present in a metal container is proportional to the inverse of the
square root of the partial pressure differential across the wall:
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APPENDIX A (continued)'
. . ,
lff eq4
This shows that the most severe requirement on metalic wall material
would occur at the lower partial pressure limit specified at 10 torr
even though the actual leak rate is higher at the higher partial pressures.
The criteria for the wall material leak rate then becomes:
q £ 8 x 10~10x£ eq 5
A
at P = 10 Torr
For a 50 cubic centimeter sample with 60 square centimeters of surface area
we find:
q /. 6.6 x 10" cc . mm
cn^ Tsec
- 8.7 x ID'17 atm • cc at ^ = 10 t'0"
cm. sec
However the quantity, q, is usually specified as a permeation constant, s, in
terms of 1 cm or 1 atm differential pressure. The valves of s corresponding
to the above leak rate are:
s = 2.8 x 10'14 afan ' cc @&P = lcmHg
crn • SGC
i A m-13 atm . cc @AP = 1 atmJL , 4 X 10
cm . sec
1 i n~8 micron-liters @ ^ P = 1 atm
J.• X J.U x~
cm . min
